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[P]eople will be surprised at the eagerness with which we
went about pretending to rouse from its slumber a sexuality
which everything—our discourses, our customs, our institutions,
our regulations, our knowledges—was busy producing in the
light of day and broadcasting to noisy accompaniment.
1
–Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality
INTRODUCTION
The phone call changed Hollie Toups’s life, and not for the
better.
On the other end of the line, a friend told her, “I overheard
some people talking about a website. Its [sic] pictures, you
know, explicit photos that people have posted . . . [and] you’re
2
on there.” A former boyfriend had uploaded naked photos of
Toups to a website specializing in revenge porn—the practice of
disclosing nude or sexually explicit images and videos, often
along with identifying personal information, of former romantic
3
partners without their consent. In Toups’s case, the photos
were accompanied by a link to her Facebook profile, along with
4
her name.
Toups had intended the photos solely for her thenboyfriend. When he shared the images without her consent,
though, they became widely known. Toups, who is from a small
town in Texas, found that “the website was flooded with people
that I knew . . . . Those of us on there go to the grocery store
1. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
158 (1978).
2. Women’s Outrage After Ex-Boyfriends Post Revenge Photos, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/01/
womens-outrage-after-ex-boyfriends-post-nude-photos (quoting Hollie Toups).
3. See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV.
655, 681 (2012); Women Sue Explicit “Revenge Porn” Site After Jilted Lovers
Anonymously Posted Revealing Pictures of Them, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 26, 2013,
6:47 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2268476/Ex-plicit-revenge
-porn-site-allowed-jilted-lovers-anonymously-post-revealing-pics-girlfriends
-facing-class-action-suit.html.
4. Jessica Roy, Victims of Revenge Porn Mount Class Action Suit Against
GoDaddy and Texxxan.com, BETABEAT (Jan. 21, 2013, 10:58 AM), http://
betabeat.com/2013/01/victims-of-revenge-porn-mount-class-action-suit-against
-godaddy-and-texxxan-com.
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5

and everybody recognizes you.” Her experience is increasingly
common, both in her desire to share intimate photos with a
partner, and in the subsequent unauthorized distribution of
those photos. Surveys by researcher Holly Jacobs found that
over half (53.3%) of heterosexual respondents had shared a
nude photo with someone else, and nearly three-quarters
(74.8%) of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) re6
spondents had done so. In one study, 44% of teenage males reported having viewed at least one nude photo of a female
7
classmate. A survey by the National Campaign to Prevent
Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy found that 20% of teenagers
ages 13–19 had sent or posted nude or semi-nude images or
videos of themselves; the rate rose to 33% for young adults ages
8
20–26.
Unauthorized distribution of intimate images and videos is
also frequent. The now-defunct revenge porn site IsAnyoneUp?
featured images of thousands of people and, at its height of
9
popularity, received 30 million page views per month. The
site’s proprietor, Hunter Moore, claimed to have received
10
10,000 images in the first three months of operation. Jacobs’s
5. Abby Rogers, More than 20 Women Are Suing a Texas “Revenge Porn”
Site and GoDaddy, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/class-action-lawsuit-against-texxxancom-2013-1.
6. E-mail from Holly Jacobs to Derek Bambauer (June 28, 2013) [hereinafter Jacobs E-mail] (on file with author). The research is from Holly Jacobs,
An Examination of Psychological Meaningfulness, Safety, and Availability as
the Underlying Mechanisms linking Job Features and Personal Characteristics to Work Engagement (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) [hereinafter Jacobs
Dissertation], available at http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/904. Jacobs’ dissertation examined the element of work engagement in an organizational setting. She assessed the effects that job features and personal characteristics
have on work engagement through the psychological conditions of meaningfulness, safety, and availability.
7. Alexandra Marks, Charges Against “Sexting” Teenagers Highlight Legal Gaps, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 2 (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.csmonitor
.com/Innovation/Responsible-Tech/2009/0330/charges-against-sexting
-teenagers-highlight-legal-gaps (quoting WIRED SAFETY, https://www.wired
safety.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2014)).
8. Julie Baumgardner, Teen Pregnancy Prevention, FIRST THINGS FIRST,
http://firstthings.org/teen-pregnancy-prevention-1 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
9. Memphis Barker, “Revenge Porn” Is No Longer a Niche Activity Which
Victimises Only Celebrities—The Law Must Intervene, INDEPENDENT (May 19,
2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-no
-longer-a-niche-activity-which-victimises-only-celebrities--the-law-must
-intervene-8622574.html.
10. Kashmir Hill, Revenge Porn with a Facebook Twist, FORBES (July 6,
2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/06/revenge
-porn-with-a-facebook-twist.
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research found that 22.1% of heterosexual respondents, and
23.3% of LGBT ones, had been the victims of unauthorized dis11
tribution. People increasingly share intimate media—nude or
sexually explicit photos or videos—with their partners. And,
those partners increasingly betray that trust by sharing those
media without consent.
Legal scholars have just begun to grapple with the issues
surrounding production and distribution of intimate photos and
videos. Most have turned instinctively to privacy as the doctrine best able to regulate intimate media, focusing principally
on the prevention of non-consensual distribution. For example,
Mary Anne Franks treats revenge porn as part of on-line sexual
12
harassment. Danielle Citron proposes an amendment to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which immunizes
Internet sites for tortious third-party content, that would remove sites designed to facilitate illegal conduct, or used princi13
pally for such conduct, from its safe harbor. Similarly, Nancy
Kim would alter Section 230 to impose proprietor-style liability
on website sponsors whose sites are used for cyber14
harassment. Anupam Chander looks to a reinvigorated tort of
15
public disclosure of private facts as one solution. Martha
Nussbaum views the problem as the on-line, pornographic objectification of women; she suggests that changes in cultural
norms (in particular, the culture of masculinity) are the key to
16
ameliorating it. Eric Goldman proposes a privacy-related con17
sent and take-down system for sex tapes.
And Ariel

11. Jacobs Dissertation, supra note 6.
12. Franks, supra note 3, at 681.
13. Danielle Citron, Revenge Porn and the Uphill Battle to Pierce Section
230 Immunity (Part II), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 25, 2013, 3:30PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/01/revenge-porn-and-the
-uphill-battle-to-pierce-section-230-immunity-part-ii.html. Section 230 is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
14. Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 993, 1034–44.
15. Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE
OFFENSIVE INTERNET 124, 129–33 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 2010).
16. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE
OFFENSIVE INTERNET, supra note 15, at 68, 84–87.
17. Eric Goldman, The Sex Tape Problem… and a Possible Legislative Solution?, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 11, 2008, 10:38 AM), http://blog
.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/07/the_sex_tape_pr.htm (noting that, while
Goldman favors a limited solution, “the most obvious problem is that this
would proliferate yet another limited privacy law as a point solution to a spe-
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Ronneburger would establish a notice and take-down regime,
similar to that of Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright
18
Act (DMCA), to deal with what she calls “Porn 2.0.”
Surprisingly, though, current privacy law provides few if
any effective remedies for people whose intimate media are distributed without authorization. They can sue the person who
uploaded the photos (typically a former partner) under a host of
19
theories: disclosure of private facts, false light, breach of im20
21
plied
confidentiality,
perhaps
defamation,
perhaps
22
cyberstalking. These remedies are effective against the person
initially disclosing the media. But, these claims cannot reach
the true source of the problem: ongoing Internet distribution of
intimate media. For most people whose photos or videos have
been shared without consent, the principal harm is not the disclosure by a former partner: that relationship is past. Rather,
the injury occurs from the ongoing, repeated dissemination of
the sensitive content. For Toups, the difficulty was not that an
ex had betrayed her; rather, it was that anyone she met might
23
have viewed the images he uploaded. Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act immunizes web hosts and other
interactive computer services from most third-party tort liabil24
ity. It shields even sites that encourage users to upload inticific problem instead of providing a more comprehensive omnibus privacy regulatory scheme preferred by privacy advocates”).
18. Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal
Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 2009 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 28–30.
19. See, e.g., Petition for Damages and Class Action Certification, Toups v.
GoDaddy.com, No. D130018-C (Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 18, 2013), 2013 WL 271500
(listing causes of action including invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, appropriation of name or
likeness, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
20. Woodrow Hartzog, How to Fight Revenge Porn, ATLANTIC (May 10,
2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/how
-to-fight-revenge-porn/275759.
21. Cf. Mary Flood, Web Post on Herpes at Center of Woman’s Lawsuit,
HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 2009, http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena
-news/article/Web-post-on-herpes-at-center-of-woman-s-lawsuit-1729971.php.
22. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint, U.S. v. Savader, No. 2:13-mj-30236-JU
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/137623866/US-v-Adam
-Savader-Complaint; Roy, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Roy, supra note 4; Jessica Roy, A Victim Speaks: Standing
Up to a Revenge Porn Tormentor, BETABEAT (May 1, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://
betabeat.com/2013/05/revenge-porn-holli-thometz-criminal-case.
24. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L. REV. 373
(2010).
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mate media without authorization, or that refuse to remove
25
such content. Legal theories that hold the initial source accountable provide little comfort if they fail to prevent further
26
dissemination. The likely result, as revenge porn gains increasing media attention, is that people will forgo consensual
sharing of intimate media out of fear.
Using privacy law to address issues surrounding intimate
media reveals only half of the picture—a privacy approach concentrates on the risks of this content and ignores its potential
rewards. Strikingly, scholars have failed to assess the potential
for intellectual property (IP) law to regulate the production and
distribution of intimate media (except by obviating IP protec27
tion). Indeed, this author’s suggestion that copyright law
might be used in such a fashion provoked noted copyright expert Rebecca Tushnet to respond that “concern for the victims
of these reprehensible [revenge porn] sites is understandable,
28
but distorting copyright law is not the right solution.” That
response, though, begs the question: what is the proper role for
copyright law in regulating production of intimate photos and
29
videos? Legal scholarship typically treats intellectual property
systems as the default choice to structure how expressive content is produced, distributed, and consumed—why should inti30
mate media be an exception? Intellectual property law is both
25. See, e.g., Global Royalties v. XCentric Ventures, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929,
933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“It is obvious that a website entitled Ripoff Report encourages the publication of defamatory content . . . . However, there is no authority
for the proposition that this makes the website operator responsible, in whole
or in part, for the ‘creation or development’ of every post on the site.”).
26. This Article discusses privacy law and criminal law approaches in
Part IV infra, and sets forth reasons why they are less effective than a copyright-based approach.
27. Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 44–
46 (2012) (proposing to deny copyright protection to revenge porn, and suggesting, as a second-best alternative, vesting copyright in the victim rather
than in the person capturing the image or video). Bartow concedes that her
primary approach, which would enable distribution without risk of infringement, is not likely to curb dissemination of revenge porn, but argues for her
proposal as an expressive matter. Id. at 45–46.
28. Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1001, 1030 (2013).
29. “Distort” implies a deviation from a desired baseline. Tushnet’s article
does not identify such a baseline, though clearly it is at odds with the framework proposed here. Ironically, the Tushnet article’s approach to copyright’s
authorship doctrine is functionalist: “Authorship moves around as needed to
meet the needs of the industry.” Id. at 1021.
30. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 274–80, 282 (2012) (critiquing the “reflexive
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likely to be effective in shaping the generation of intimate me31
dia, and overlooked as a candidate for that role.
This Article is the first to propose bringing the production
of intimate media within the ambit of intellectual property law.
It contends that the consensual production and distribution of
intimate media is normatively desirable—it brings people, particularly those in intimate relationships, closer together, and
allows them to express romantic and sexual feelings in new
32
ways. Intimate media are an important exemplar of non33
commercial amateur production of expressive content. However, the risk of non-consensual distribution or display threat34
ens to undercut the generation of intimate media. A romantic
partner is likely to be unwilling to produce such images or video if she fears that, should the media be shared without her
consent, she will have no ability to use legal means to counter35
act that distribution. In particular, copyright doctrine can encourage production and dissemination, through legitimate
channels, of this type of information by providing potent remedies against improper distribution.
Tailoring copyright law to encourage production of intimate media is both normatively desirable and entirely in keeping with copyright’s pattern of media and industry-specific ad-

strengthening of existing intellectual property regimes to facilitate commercialization”).
31. Litigators employ IP-based claims on occasion when dealing with unauthorized distribution of intimate media. See, e.g., Complaint, Middleton v.
Bollaert, No. 13-11968-cv (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2013) (asserting claim for copyright infringement), http://bv.1110.cds.contentcolo.net/uploads/files/
Lindsay%20Middleton%20%20Complaint%20-%20Filed%20Version.pdf. I
thank Erica Johnstone for this reference.
32. See generally Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing legal doctrine should recognize the value of sexual
intimacy and pleasure).
33. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing rise of peer production).
34. See Richard Morgan, Revenge Porn, DETAILS.COM (2008), http://www
.details.com/sex-relationships/porn-and-perversions/200809/revenge-porn
(quoting CEO of ReputationDefender that “[t]he best advice, of course, is to
never, ever create sexual photos, videos, e-mails, text messages, or anything
else that someone could keep and share in the future”).
35. See, e.g., Susanna Lichter, Unwanted Exposure: Civil and Criminal
Liability for Revenge Porn Hosts and Posters, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG. (May
28, 2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/unwanted-exposure-civil
-and-criminal-liability-for-revenge-porn-hosts-and-posters (describing legal
hurdles to forcing websites to remove unauthorized intimate media).
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36

justment. Counterintuitively, creating sufficient incentives to
produce requires recognizing the interests of people captured in
these videos or photos. The greatest risk to production comes
from subjects’ fears about improper dissemination. Providing
legal protection that enables them to block non-consensual dis37
tribution is thus a generative move. This Article proposes creating a new right for people who appear in, and can be reasonably identified by, intimate media: the right to prevent
38
distribution or display of those media without their consent. It
justifies that proposal normatively by describing the value of
consensual production and distribution, which is threatened by
infringement.
More abstractly, approaching intimate media issues from a
copyright perspective highlights important doctrinal tensions,
particularly regarding the allocation of rights via the definition
of authorship and clashes with the First Amendment. On these
fronts, the Article’s proposal is provocative: it presses against
the boundaries of authorship and free speech limits to test how
stringent they are. It argues that each concept constrains copyright law less than is commonly believed. That result is useful
for intimate media, but may be troublesome for copyright more
generally—a problem beyond this Article’s scope.
Five further parts comprise this Article. First, it describes
the benefits that flow from consensual sharing of intimate media, the harms worked by unauthorized distribution, and the
concomitant risks to production. Then, the Article offers its
proposal: creation of a new negative right vested in identifiable
subjects of intimate media over distribution and display. Next,
it uses intimate media to explore doctrinal puzzles in copyright
related to authorship and free expression. The Article concludes by arguing that regulation of intimate media offers a
valuable case study for addressing the challenges wrought by a
36. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012) (creating compulsory license for
musical compositions embodied in publicly-distributed phonorecords); id.
§ 106A (creating waivable, but inalienable, rights of attribution and integrity
for authors of works of visual art); id. § 120 (limiting copyright entitlements
for architectural works). See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
35–38 (2001).
37. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 2–18 (2008)
(describing generativity).
38. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (enabling authors of works of visual art
to prevent their intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification if prejudicial to the author’s reputation and, for works of recognized stature, to prevent
their destruction).
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technological environment where the costs of producing and
distributing information have plummeted to nearly zero.
I. BENEFITS AND HARMS OF INTIMATE MEDIA
While the harms of revenge porn have increasingly attracted media attention, the benefits of consensual sharing of intimate photos and videos are largely overlooked. This Section describes the benefits that can accrue to partners who willingly
share these media with one another as part of sexual or emotional intimacy. These gains justify deploying copyright law as
a means of protecting them, and of encouraging production of
more intimate media. Then, the Section describes how unauthorized distribution not only threatens to work a forfeiture of
these rewards, but also risks causing both utilitarian and deontological harms to the subjects of intimate media. Nonconsensual sharing—which would count as copyright infringement under this Article’s proposal—creates real losses to those
who appear in explicit photos or videos, and the risk of those
harms threatens to deter socially valuable production of expression.
A. SEXTING’S VIRTUES
The consensual production and sharing of intimate media
offer significant social value, such that these activities warrant
expanded copyright protection to foster them. The exchange of
intimate media between consenting partners benefits those involved. It enables them to engage in pleasurable sexual activi39
ty, which creates both individual and societal benefits. It allows partners to remain intimate even while separated in space
40
or time. The practice can help people to overcome inhibitions
and feel better able to express attraction and other sexual feel41
ings. Qualitative research suggests that sharing sexually provocative images can increase confidence, encourage partners to
experiment with new behavior, and build anticipation for other

39. See Kaplan, supra note 32.
40. See, e.g., Jessica Leshnoff, Sexting Not Just for Kids, AARP (June
2011),
http://www.aarp.org/relationships/love-sex/info-11-2009/sexting_not_
just_for_kids.html (describing a relationship coach whose client was “a wife
who enjoys sexting her husband while he's traveling on business, telling (and
showing) him what he's missing at home”).
41. Id. (quoting psychotherapist Dr. Jonathan Alpert).
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42

sexual activity. This type of intimacy is increasingly common.
A 2012 survey of 5,000 single adults in the U.S. by dating site
Match.com found that 57% of men and 45% of women had re43
ceived an intimate image via mobile phone (a “sext”). Thirtyfive percent of the women, and 38% of the men, had sent a sext,
even though 72% recognized the practice carried some career
44
risk, and 75% thought it could create reputation risk. The
practice crosses generational boundaries; it is increasingly
45
common among seniors, for example.
Moreover, use of intimate media may be particularly important for people with minority sexual preferences, or who are
46
uncertain about what their preferences are. The greater anonymity and psychological distance provided by this type of
communication can be useful to those concerned about being
47
identified with a particular preference. Production of consensual intimate media allows people to challenge prevailing gender norms and communication patterns, and to take some con48
trol over self-representation. Empirical data support the
contention that use of intimate media is more prevalent (and
thus likely important) among communities with minority sexual preferences. Survey data collected by researcher Holly Jacobs finds that the creation and use of intimate media is much
more prevalent for LGBT respondents than it is for heterosex49
ual ones. Jacobs surveyed 691 participants, 488 self-identified
50
as heterosexual, and 103 as LGBT. In response to the question, “Have you ever taken a nude photo/video of yourself and
shared it with someone else?,” 53.3% of heterosexual partici42. Yvonne K. Fulbright, Scintillating Sexting, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 14,
2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mate-relate-and-communicate/20
1209/scintillating-sexting.
43. More on Sexting and Texting from SIA 3, UPTODATE (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://blog.match.com/2013/02/05/more-on-sexting-and-texting-from-sia-3.
44. Id.
45. Senior Sexting Gaining Steam, AZCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 8, 2010, 9:45
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/offbeat/articles/2010/02/08/20100208seniors
-sexting.html.
46. See Amy Adele Hasinoff, Sexting as Media Production: Rethinking social Media and Sexuality, 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 449, 457–58 (2012); Jeffrey
G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV.
661, 702 (1995) (“[G]ay male pornography is a necessary tool in gay men's
struggle to attain sexual integrity.”).
47. Hasinoff, supra note 46, at 455–56.
48. Id. at 456–57.
49. Jacobs E-mail, supra note 6.
50. Jacobs used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to conduct the survey. Id.
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pants responded “Yes”—but 74.8% of LGBT ones replied af51
firmatively, a statistically significant difference. LGBT individuals were also more likely to have allowed someone else to
take a nude photo or video of them; 49.5% had done so, compared to 41.2% of heterosexual respondents (though this differ52
ence is not statistically significant). Interestingly, despite the
higher rate of production of intimate media among LGBT participants, they reported rates of unauthorized sharing (becoming the victims of revenge porn) that were almost indistinguishable from heterosexual respondents: 23.3% LGBT, versus
53
22.1% heterosexual. While the use of intimate media is increasingly common overall, it appears to be particularly salient
54
for LGBT communities.
Increasingly, mainstream media coverage and relationship
advice laud the virtues of sharing intimate media. The Huffington Post, for example, mixes standard warnings about sexting
with positive treatment from therapists like Esther Perel, who
stated, “[s]ex and love online gives you [the ability] to express
55
yourself in ways that you [normally] do not.” And, Perel notes,
intimate media can help rebuild as well as maintain relationships: “[couples] can reconnect with the erotic dimension of
their sexual relations. . . [it is] a very creative intervention for
56
couples trying to rekindle their relationships.” Nickelodeon’s
Parents Connect features an article on how to sext your spouse,
including advice such as “Take a naughty picture of yourself
with your phone’s camera and SMS it to your hubby. . . get racy
57
and give him a peep at your delicious décolletage.” The web51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See generally Anne Collier, The Girls Are All Right: Girls Not as Vulnerable to Sexting as Media Says, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 13, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/Family/Modern-Parenthood/2013/0513/
The-girls-are-all-right-Girls-not-as-vulnerable-to-sexting-as-media-says (quoting Australian researcher Nina Funnell that “taking and sharing nude images
is an established courtship practice within many parts of the gay community
and that apps such as Grindr have popularized the practice considerably”).
55. Emma Gray, Adult Sexting: Does It Help or Hurt Relationships?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/04/20/adult-sexting-relationships_n_1439404.html.
56. Id.
57. How to Spice Up a Relationship by Sexting Your Spouse, NICKELODEON PARENTS CONNECT, http://www.parentsconnect.com/parents/relationships/
relationship-tips/spice-up-a-relationship/how-to-spice-up-a-relationship
-sexting-spouse.html. The ParentsConnect website recently closed. See A
ParentsConnect & NickMom Announcement: ParentsConnect Has Closed Its
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site Couples Advice recommends the smartphone app Couple,
which is a “private communication endeavor for couples” that
lets you use instant messages and shared pictures to create “a
sense of intimacy and closeness with your partner, even when
58
they aren’t necessarily physically close.” Cosmopolitan suggests that couples in long-distance relationships “make sure to
59
keep things spicy, over text, the phone, and webcam.” Similarly, the magazine suggests that such couples have a “Skype date
and challenge [each other] to a strip poker tournament a
60
deux.” Strip poker is tame compared to Cosmo’s later advice:
“Light candles around your computer for a sexy-yet-romantic
61
vibe the next time you have Skype sex.” A final example:
AOL’s Relationships site—hardly a trend-setter—hosts a video
62
entitled, “How To Have Intimate Relations Over the Phone.”
Put simply, intimate media have gone mainstream. Sharing
such videos and photos increasingly is seen as a valued activity
for consenting partners. As Bennett Capers writes, “the only
63
people we seem to frown on for sexting are politicians.”
And yet, the typical response to concerns about unauthorized distribution of intimate media is technological abstinence:
64
people simply should not create explicit photos or videos. This
Doors, NICKMOM, http://www.nickmom.com/parentsconnect (last visited Apr.
20, 2014). An archived version of the ParentsConnect article is available at the
INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://web.archive.org/web/20130807074011/http://www
.parentsconnect.com/parents/relationships/relationship-tips/spice-up-a
-relationship/how-to-spice-up-a-relationship-sexting-spouse.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2014).
58. The Tech Spark: 5 Apps That Couples Can Use to Energize a Relationship, COUPLES ADVICE, http://www.couplesadvice.com/the-tech-spark-5-apps
-that-couples-can-use-to-energize-a-relationship (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
59. Cameron Cain, The Super Long Distance Relationship Survival Guide,
COSMOPOLITAN (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sexlove/
relationship-advice/long-distance-sexy-texts#slide-4. To make the point clear,
the accompanying photo shows a woman beginning to undress in front of a
laptop. Id.
60. Korin Miller, 12 Ways to Keep Things Hot When You’re Apart, COSMOPOLITAN, at slide 11 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sexlove/
dating-advice/long-distance-relationship-tips.
61. Id. slide 12.
62. How to Have Intimate Relations over the Phone, AOL ON RELATIONSHIPS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://on.aol.com/video/how-to-have-intimate-relations
-over-the-phone-517201183.
63. I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 878
(2013).
64. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10 (noting that Internet law expert Eric
Goldman “strongly advises against making sex tapes and taking nude photos
as the best protection”); Morgan, supra note 34; Kristie Reeter, Experts Warn
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advice is increasingly unrealistic—a substantial percentage of
adults engage in such sharing, and the practice seems to be a
majoritarian one in some LGBT communities. As feminist writer Jill Filipovic notes, “[w]ithin romantic relationships, people
have always exchanged tangible things that would be highly
embarrassing if publicly revealed, whether that’s a sexy note, a
65
suggestive article of clothing or raunchy photo.” Abstinence
comes at significant cost: refraining from sharing intimate media with a partner forfeits benefits from experiencing sexual
pleasure, feeling greater intimacy, and overcoming barriers
such as social stigma or geographic distance. “Just say no” is
bad advice, not merely outdated.
Sex, like nearly everything else, is mediated by technology
now. People meet partners via Match.com and Facebook; they
arrange dates by text message; and they send intimate photos
to one another using smartphones. Couples separated by distance may use Skype or FaceTime to achieve sexual intimacy—
a practice different only in degree from steamy love letters or
phone sex. New York Times writer Frank Bruni describes his
short-distance relationship (Manhattan-Brooklyn) with his
long-time partner, noting that for them, “alone isn’t alone anymore . . . there’s Skyping, e-mailing, texting, sexting: a Kama
66
Sutra of electronic intercourse.” Once consensual use of intimate media makes the opinion page of the New York Times,
any taboo against or disapprobation of it has jumped the
67
shark. The consensual use of intimate media creates real ben-

of Revenge Porn, ABC17NEWS.COM (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:29 PM), http://m
.abc17news.com/news/abc-17-news-special-report-experts-warn-of-revenge
-porn/-/19167438/19897984/-/jujeee/-/index.html (“Cybercrimes detectives said
if you don't want a private, nude photos [sic] of yourself getting out, do not
take one in the first place.”).
65. Jill Filipovic, “Revenge Porn” Is About Degrading Women Sexually and
Professionally, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2013/jan/28/revenge-porn-degrades-women. Filipovic makes the
point even more bluntly: “Once you've been face-to-genitals with someone,
sending them a nude picture doesn't seem like it should be such a big deal.” Id.
66. Frank Bruni, Of Love and Fungus, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/bruni-of-love-and-fungus.html. I
thank Barbara Atwood for this reference, despite her horror at it.
67. The idiom “jumped the shark,” popularized by the television show
Happy Days, refers to a breaking point or an “irreversible decline.” PAUL
MCFEDRIES, THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO WEIRD WORD ORIGINS 86
(2008); see also, e.g., Fred Fox, Jr., In Defense of ‘Happy Days’ ‘Jump the
Shark’ Episode, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
sep/03/entertainment/la-et-jump-the-shark-20100903.

2038

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2025

efits for the partners involved, and is another example of the
68
generative powers of ubiquitous networked computing.
B. INFRINGEMENT’S INJURIES
The unconsented distribution of intimate media seems intuitively problematic. We understand Hollie Toups’s pain immediately. However, there are two additional, less obvious
risks flowing from unauthorized sharing. The first is straightforward: partners considering creating intimate media may
hesitate, or forgo the activity altogether, if they fear its unchecked spread beyond their intended audience. This is the
classic justification for copyright—the threat of uncontrolled
69
copying deters potential creators. There is a second, more
complex risk that derives from copyright’s allocation of entitlements. By default, copyright law fetishizes the camera’s shutter
button for intimate media: the person who presses it is likely to
70
be considered the author. Only authors can assert rights over
71
copyrightable works. Yet, this configuration neglects the interests of other people captured in intimate media, who may
not only be responsible for much of the original expression that
qualifies a work for copyright, but who also suffer dispropor72
tionately the risks of unauthorized distribution. Since these
participants by default lack status as authors under copyright
law, they have few if any tools to quash unauthorized distribu-

68. Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1974, 2030–31 (2006) (discussing theory of generativity).
69. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 330–31 (1989).
70. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1552 (2013) (“U.S. copyright law . . . has tended to locate creativity for photographic mediation in the
choices made by a photographer while deploying and operating her equipment.”); Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 439–48 (2004)
(reviewing photography cases and finding that, while courts purport to use
pre-shutter analysis of composition, the photographer is nearly always deemed
to be author). But see Lindsay v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248, 1999 WL 816163 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (finding the
director who composed storyboards and shots, not the cameraman, to be author of underwater footage).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
72. See Michael W. Carroll, Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the Performing Arts, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 797 (2012); Tushnet, supra note 28, at
1030.
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73

tion. Even if a participant were deemed a joint author of the
intimate media, she would be powerless to prevent her coauthor from giving permission for the work’s use, regardless of
74
her wishes. Romantic partners who understand this legal peculiarity may be deterred from producing intimate media, surrendering a benefit to themselves and, by extension, to society.
This subsection explores the risks to intimate media’s subjects,
as a prelude to and justification for an extension of copyright
law that protects their interests.
People featured in intimate media, who are not deemed au75
thors by copyright law, face two forms of harm. The first,
grounded in utilitarian calculus, is a probabilistic analysis of
the potential injuries, and risk of injuries, that non-consensual
distribution can generate. The second, based in deontological
analysis, is the risk of blurring the distinction between the public and private selves, and the reduced ability to engage safely
in intimate activity.
1. Negative Utils
Having one’s intimate media publicly available presents a
litany of risks. Some are mundane: employers increasingly utilize Internet resources, such as social networks and search en76
gines, to gather data on candidates. Turning up explicit photos or video should have no effect on an employer’s decision.

73. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (limiting infringement suits to “the legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright”); id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)
(limiting issuance of notifications of claimed infringement to person authorized to act on behalf of owner of exclusive right).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”); id. § 201(a) (providing
each joint author with equal, undivided interest in entire work); see Thomson
v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200–02 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing requirements of independently copyrightable contribution by each claimed joint author and mutual intent to become joint authors).
75. Cf. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131,
1133 (2011).
76. See, e.g., Steve Johnson, Those Party Photos Could Cost You a Job,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/tribu/ct
-tribu-facebook-job-dangers-20120117,0,1257938.column (noting surveys show
between 18 and 63% of employers use social media checks, but only 7% of candidates realize employers do so); Jacquelyn Smith, How Social Media Can
Help (Or Hurt) You in Your Job Search, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/04/16/how-social-media-can
-help-or-hurt-your-job-search (citing CareerBuilder study finding 37% of employers use social networks to assess candidates, and that 34% of those employers had found content causing them not to hire a candidate).
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This is intimate conduct, not workplace conduct. There are
few if any professions where intimate decisions affect an employee’s performance or qualifications. Nonetheless, both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that this sort of unre78
lated information can adversely affect a candidate’s prospects.
A survey of recruiters found 17% ruled out candidates based on
“excessive personal information” on their social media pro79
files. Reppler’s poll of 300 recruiters found that 69% had rejected a candidate based on information from their social networking profile; 11% of those had rejected someone for
80
inappropriate photos. A female Yale Law School student targeted by defamatory attacks, including about her intimate life,
on the AutoAdmit website did not obtain a single summer job
81
offer during on-campus recruiting with law firms. These firms
are extraordinarily eager to employ female Yale students with
82
strong grades, as she had. And yet not a single one considered
her worthy of a summer position.
Similarly, the rise of social networking has provided worrisome examples. A student teacher was denied a degree in education after inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that
showed her drinking an alcoholic beverage while wearing a pi83
rate costume. A Georgia high school teacher was forced to re77. One hopes.
78. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 76; Leslie Kwoh, Beware: Potential Employers Are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390443759504577631410093879278.html; Smith, supra
note 76; Employers May Misjudge Job Applicants Based on Facebook Pages,
MYFOXPHILLY.COM (July 8, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://www.myfoxphilly.com/
story/22768666/employers-may-misjudge-job-applicants-based-on-facebook
-pages (quoting North Carolina State University study finding “companies are
eliminating some conscientious job applicants based on erroneous assumptions
regarding what social media behavior tells us about the applicants”).
79. Kwoh, supra note 78.
80. Jorgen Sundberg, How Employers Use Social Media to Screen Applicants, THE UNDERCOVER RECRUITER, http://theundercoverrecruiter.com/info
graphic-how-recruiters-use-social-media-screen-applicants (last visited Apr.
20, 2014).
81. Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST,
Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/
06/AR2007030602705.html.
82. Id.; see Yale Law Sch. Career Dev. Office, Class of 2012 Employment,
YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/studentlife/cdoprospectivestudents2012
employstats.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2014); Yale Law Sch. Admissions, Entering Class Profile, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/profile
.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
83. Would-Be Teacher Denied Degree over ‘Drunken Pirate’ MySpace Photo
Sues University, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/
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sign after a parent gained access to her Facebook profile and
found a photo of her holding a pint of beer and glass of wine
84
during a trip to Europe. In Florida, a high school English
teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her principal found photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different
85
name, online. Finally, Citibank terminated a female employee
simply because she was judged to be both attractive and given
86
to wearing clothes that accentuated her appeal. Employers
should not use irrelevant information, such as explicit photos,
in hiring or retention decisions. But firms are risk-averse, and
qualified candidates are usually abundant. At least a subset of
companies decides: why risk it?
One common response is that these adverse effects work a
painful but necessary deterrence. On this account, the embarrassment, potential discrimination, and other difficulties that
subjects of intimate media face—while concededly unpleasant—are both a foreseeable consequence of deciding to be featured in the image, and also a warning to others who might do
87
so. This argument founders in the face of two rebuttals. First,
this approach forfeits the many benefits of consensual intimate
media based on the risk that one party will violate the shared
expectations under which that video or image was produced.
Intimate media can be used for ends fair and foul. Yet it would
seem foolish to propose giving up firearms, digital video recorders, or encryption code simply because those technologies can
story/2007/04/29/would-be-teacher-denied-degree-over-drunken-pirate
-myspace-photo-sues.
84. Teacher Sacked for Posting Picture of Herself Holding Glass of Wine
and Mug of Beer on Facebook, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 7, 2011, 06:45 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1354515/Teacher-sacked-posting
-picture-holding-glass-wine-mug-beer-Facebook.html.
85. Olivia Sprauer, Teacher, Forced to Resign After Bikini Photos Emerge,
UPI.COM (May 9, 2013, 1:18 PM), http://www.upi.com/blog/2013/05/09/Olivia
-Sprauer-teacher-forced-to-resign-after-bikini-photos-emerge/2531368119876.
86. See Meghan Casserly, Debrahlee Lorenzana: Is the Ex-Citibank Employee Victim or Villain?, FORBES (June 2, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/work-in-progress/2010/06/02/debrahlee-lorenzana-is-the-ex-citibank
-employee-victim-or-villian.
87. Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet's
Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR2005070601953.html (describing famous
case of Dog Poop Girl in Korea, whose failure to clean up after her dog was
captured on video and made her a pariah). But see Jane Yakowitz Bambauer,
The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 259–60 (2012) (arguing Dog
Poop Girl “did not deserve to bear the full brunt of the world's contempt for
litterers”).
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88

be used to create harm as well as benefits. Rather, we regu89
late to channel uses in socially appropriate directions.
Second, the rational actor theory of deterrence, where people logically calculate risk versus reward, has crumbled under
the weight of research in cognitive psychology and behavioral
90
economics. For example, optimism bias causes us to discount
the likelihood of suffering harm that others do, even when we
91
face the same incidence of risk. This is particularly true where
we perceive that harm as stemming from volitional conduct—
92
where our judgment plays a role in the outcome. Even if this
represents deluded or biased thinking, it is plainly a persistent
delusion or bias. Sex and wisdom rarely go hand in hand. This
means the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no
real work in changing behavior. Pretending that it does creates
93
real harm to victims with little benefit to potential victims.
In short, non-consensual distribution of intimate media
creates tangible, even quantifiable risks and harms for those
appearing in it.

88. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking
down Illinois ban on carrying loaded, accessible firearms); Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting secondary
liability challenge to remote DVR); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d
1132, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 1999) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds,
ban on international distribution of encryption software).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (prohibiting felons, certain mentally ill
persons, and people subject to domestic violence restraining orders, among
others, from possessing firearms or ammunition shipped in interstate or foreign commerce); MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–41 (2005) (establishing inducement liability under copyright for actors who distribute dualuse technologies, but promote unlawful use); 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (2013) (establishing recipient-based system for determining whether export registration
and product classification is required).
90. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2010); RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2009); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein
& Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998).
91. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463,
468–70 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232 (1989).
92. Weinstein, supra note 91, at 1232.
93. See Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn
Edition, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions
.com/archives/2013/02/adventures-in-victim-blaming-revenge-porn-edition
.html.
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2. The Public, the Private, and the Intimate
In addition to the risks and injuries outlined above, nonconsensual distribution of media capturing intimate activity
causes harms less tangible, but no less real. These harms arise
in at least three forms.
First, tactics such as revenge porn intrude upon a sphere of
94
intimate, highly personal conduct. Some distribution will en95
croach upon the shared space of a romantic relationship.
Maintaining the boundaries of that sphere—boundaries which
can be crossed only with the assent of each participant—is crit96
ical. Intimate relationships are where we explore sensitive,
even secret aspects of ourselves. A key component of that exploration is control over the decision to whom to expose those
97
characteristics. Non-consensual distribution deprives us of
that decision, injuring our autonomy. If we have no recourse
against trespass, we may be discouraged from fully experienc98
ing intimacy, both sexual and emotional, in all its forms.
Second, non-consensual distribution works an injury because of its purpose as well as its method. Revenge porn employs the darker part of the human emotional spectrum:
99
shame, humiliation, fear, and disgust. It converts a core human pleasure into a source of pain. Some images and videos are
accompanied by commentary making this intent plain: the people portrayed in them are described as sluts or whores, as de100
serving of abuse, as dirty or degraded. The injury is worsened
if the attacker is someone with whom the victim shared a previous relationship of trust: the shift from lover to aggressor—
101
from Jekyll to Hyde—is part of the harm. And, we may have
94. Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010).
95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
96. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L.
REV. 311 (2013).
97. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087,
1121 (2002).
98. Anderson, supra note 96, at 321 (“Bodily intimacy is what distinguishes a picture of one's face in the newspaper from a picture of one's genitals
in the same newspaper.”).
99. See Filipovic, supra note 65 (stating revenge porn is “about hating
women, taking enjoyment in seeing them violated, and harming them”).
100. See, e.g., Kelly Bourdet, Future Sex: Pornographic Trolling Is the Ultimate Trolling, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://motherboard
.vice.com/blog/future-sex-pornographic-trolling-is-the-ultimate-trolling; Hill,
supra note 10; Roy, supra note 4.
101. See Roy, supra note 4.
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concerns about viewers of this material as well. Revenge porn
caters not to an interest in sex, but to a prurient interest in
102
sex. We may believe that the desire to see non-consensual
images of intimate activity is in itself problematic, and should
103
be discouraged.
Third, while rigorous data are not yet available, non104
consensual distribution appears to be a gendered problem. It
105
seems to target women disproportionately. This is likely both
a cause and an effect of differential societal norms regarding
sexual activity (at least, sexual activity outside marriage). A
man who is photographed having sex is a stud, or a playboy. A
106
woman who does so is a whore. Thus, non-consensual distribution risks worsening tenacious social mores that treat those
who engage in sex differently based upon gender, and it may
107
cause victims to internalize those norms.
The intrusive, purposive, and gendered aspects of nonconsensual distribution work real harms upon participants,
even if those harms cannot be quantified.
C. THE FRAGILE PRODUCTION OF INTIMATE MEDIA
Intimate media are a fascinating, and fragile, example of
amateur non-commercial production. This mode of producing
information is shaped by current IP rules, but in ways that
threaten to curtail output rather than to generate it. Unmodi102. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting ALI
Model Penal Code and defining prurient interest as “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion”).
103. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 27, at 28, 45–46. This claim is similar to
that made on behalf of obscenity statutes, which ban material appealing to the
prurient interest and lacking countervailing value. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1466
(2012). Legislation based on social mores is controversial: the argument that
certain consumption preferences are illegitimate has been advanced to oppose
gay marriage, pornography, and violent video games. See United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Determining when such arguments are legitimate is beyond the scope of this Article; I simply offer concern about consumers of revenge porn as one species of deontological argument that could support regulation.
104. Filipovic, supra note 65; Franks, supra note 93; Amanda Hess, The
Real Difference Between Teenage Boys and Girls’ Sexting Habits? Boys Forward More, XX FACTOR (Mar. 4, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2013/03/04/sexting_statistics_teen_boys_and_girls_sext_in_
equal_numbers_but_boys_forward.html.
105. See Bartow, supra note 27, at 25–34, 44–46.
106. Id. at 27–34.
107. See Filipovic, supra note 65.
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fied, then, copyright law is misaligned with the laudable goal of
encouraging the consensual production and sharing of intimate
media. This subsection explains why, as context for the reform
proposal advanced in the next Section.
As a utilitarian matter, copyright law enables creators to
108
recover costs of production. Authors face the time and expense of creating works initially, and must price this sunk cost
109
into their per-copy fee (average cost). Copyists, by contrast,
face only the marginal cost of reproducing the work once it is
110
released.
Absent norms-based considerations or legal constraint, consumers will do the math and pick the cheaper option: marginal cost is less than average. The copyists capture
sales. Potential authors—no fools—can predict this quandary,
111
and will forgo production. Copyright law is one way out of
this dilemma: it forces consumers to pay the author, at average
112
cost, to bribe the author to produce the work initially.
This simple economic story falls apart completely for intimate media. People create these videos and images for nonpecuniary reasons: to express affection and lust, to remain connected to an existing partner, to court a new one. When used
for their intended purpose, intimate photos and videos are noncommercial; they are generated between partners, for their mutual use and consumption. (Where the people involved consent
to sharing the materials with others, intimate media become
amateur pornography, if non-commercial, or simply pornogra113
phy if commercial. ) The costs of production, and the possibility of recovering them, are usually both minimal and irrele114
vant. The intended market for these images is quite limited
and perhaps monopsonistic: a single producer offering wares to
a single consumer. Demand is highly elastic: substituting a
108. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 328–29. There are other normative bases for copyright. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2011).
109. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 326–29.
110. Id. at 328–29.
111. Id. at 326.
112. Thomas Macaulay called copyright “a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers.” Thomas Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House
of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841).
113. See Amanda Hess, Can Cindy Gallop’s Crowdsourced Porn Take Down
Mainstream Pornography?, XX FACTOR (Aug. 27, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www
.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2012/08/27/cindy_gallop_and_crowdsourced_porn_
can_real_world_sex_online_take_down_mainstream_porn_.html.
114. See Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 735, 798–800 (2013).
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stranger’s photo for that of one’s partner drastically reduces the
benefit received. Intimate media are perhaps the ultimate bespoke good, tailored for a single buyer. Compensation is in kind
rather than in cash—the return is in other such media, or inti115
macy, or a first date. The cost recovery justification for copyright protection is orthogonal to the incentives to create and
distribute intimate media. Copyright’s standard economic calculus simply doesn’t hold here. It uses mechanisms that
misalign with the mode of production of intimate media.
And yet, copyright’s underlying reasoning is precisely correct: infringement threatens production, and makes creators
wary of investing in the generation of intimate media, though
not for pecuniary reasons. Non-consensual exchange can harm
the producer of the media, its subject, or both. It violates the
shared set of expectations and norms that govern production in
this context—and, as Larry Lessig reminds us, norms too are a
116
type of law. The holder of the media file (who may be the author) may gain some benefit, perhaps an illicit one, from the
117
unauthorized sharing. But, the other party in the transaction—the subject of the media—loses, with little chance at protecting him or herself. Predicting the risk, that person may decide to forgo production.
As this Article discusses below, copyright tries, somewhat
poorly, to accommodate the creative contributions of those besides the primary author—like the subject of intimate media—
118
via contract, via joint authorship, or via no recourse at all.
None of these work well for intimate media. Joint authorship’s
requirements are typically too stringent, and courts are hesi119
tant to recognize such claims after the fact. Contractual bar115. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 104.
116. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 11, 26 (2006).
117. See, e.g., Alex Morris, Hunter Moore: The Most Hated Man on the Internet, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/
news/the-most-hated-man-on-the-internet-20121113.
118. See infra Part III.A.
119. Joint authorship requires intent by all joint authors that they become
so. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work” as one “prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole”); see Shun-ling Chen,
Collaborative Authorship: From Folklore to the Wikiborg, 2011 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 131, 136 (“Courts have consistently chosen to narrowly interpret the joint work clause.”). On courts’ reluctance, see, for example, Richlin v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998); and Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.
1991).
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gaining works well in professional production settings but is
120
unsuited to informal, amateur production. People rarely employ formal contracts in intimate settings, even when the risks
are clear. Famously, half of all marriages in the United States
121
end in divorce. And yet, only an estimated 5–10% of couples
122
enter into prenuptial agreements. People are unduly optimis123
tic about their risk of marital failure.
Bargaining over a
breakdown in an intimate relationship is simply too unpleasant
for many, and partners worry about the signal that asking for a
124
pre-nup sends.
Production of intimate media often takes
place under circumstances even less amenable to contracting,
such as between prospective partners, where the request for
formal legal precautions may radically undercut the prospects
125
of completing the transaction. Few people want a date preceded by a license agreement. And finally, an absence of recourse risks undercutting production. Subjects may be deterred
from being photographed or filmed if they have no protection
against unauthorized sharing. Those whose media have been
distributed without consent certainly are deterred—one woman
wrote, “I will never, ever, ever send a picture again. . . I don’t
126
care if I’m married to you.”
At present, copyright law will rarely come to the aid of
someone featured in intimate media distributed without their
127
consent. If that person is the subject of the media, but not the
120. See generally Benkler, supra note 33, at 439–40.
121. Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2009, 58
NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 1 (Aug. 27, 2010) (listing marriage and divorce
rates of 7.1 and 3.5 per million population for 2008, and 6.8 and 3.4, respectively, for 2009).
122. Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 1
(Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No.
436, 2003), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436
.pdf.
123. Id. at 9–10.
124. Id. at 11–12.
125. Cf. UM Study: Sexting May Be Normal Dating Behavior for Internet
Generation, CBS 62 DETROIT (July 24, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal
.com/2012/07/24/um-study-sexting-may-be-normal-dating-behavior-for
-internet-generation.
126. Elaine Silvestrini, Legislators Intend to Outlaw “Revenge Porn,”
TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 17, 2013, http://tbo.com/news/politics/legislators-intend-to
-outlaw-revenge-porn-b82475546z1.
127. But see Amanda M. Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge
Porn, TRI-STATE REGION IP WORKSHOP, Winter 2014, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2374119 (arguing that since 80% of revenge porn images
are selfies taken by the subject, copyright can be an effective counterweight).
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photographer or videographer of it, he or she is unlikely to be
128
considered the work’s author. Copyright vests in the author;
non-authors are left to the mercies of other doctrines such as
129
contract or quantum meruit. Even if the subject is also the
author, as in the case of “selfie” photos, he or she will have a
difficult time finding counsel to take the case, at least on a con130
tingency basis. Lawyers’ time is expensive, and actual damages from infringement are quite likely to be minimal—the
value of a license to a particular piece of amateur porn is generally miniscule. While statutory damages for infringement are
available in theory, an author must register the work within
131
three months of first publication to obtain them. Few people
are likely to register intimate media, and fewer still to do so
132
within the requisite statutory period. In short, for copyright
to assist people featured in intimate media distributed without
their consent, they must be an author of the work, and either
be able to pay an attorney’s hourly rate or have registered the
work within three months of its first appearance on the Inter133
net. Those are unlikely circumstances.
Given this scenario—where copyright protection is necessary to allow intimate media to flourish, but its current configuration does not provide adequate safeguards—reform is need128. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1143 (2011).
129. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000)
(denying movie contributor’s joint authorship claim, but permitting quantum
meruit claim to proceed).
130. See Selfie, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY BUZZWORDS (July 2, 2013), http://
www.macmillandictionary.com/us/buzzword/entries/selfie.html (defining
“selfie” as “a photograph of you taken by yourself, usually for use in social media”).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012).
132. It is evidently rare for photographers to register their works at all.
Christian J. Fisher, Addition Through Subtraction: The Resolution of Copyright Registration Uncertainty Through the Repeal of §§ 411(a) and 412, 14
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 191, 228 (2011); cf. Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1487, 1493 (2011) (“The disputes that have fleshed out the requirements for
photographic copyright have arisen over professional images . . . .”).
133. A number of high-profile revenge porn lawsuits are being handled pro
bono, likely for precisely this reason. See, e.g., Chet Hardin, The Face of
Revenge Porn, COLORADO SPRINGS INDEP. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www
.csindy.com/coloradosprings/the-face-of-revenge/Content?oid=2608450; Nathan
Mattise, Revenge Porn Site Founder Loses $250K Defamation Suit, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/
03/revenge-porn-site-founder-loses-250k-defamation-suit. While pro bono efforts are admirable, they will not scale to meet the scope of the problem.
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ed. This argument rests upon a conclusion for which robust data remain sparse: the threat of unauthorized sharing of intimate media reduces the output of that expression, compared to
what output would be under a system of robust copyright protection, such as proposed in this Article. A chilling effect is intuitively plausible, given lurid media coverage of stories on revenge porn, and given revenge porn victims’ vows to never
134
again be captured in intimate media.
As the data from
Match.com shows, the minority of people who sext are well
135
aware of the risks of doing so. Their numbers would probably
grow if those risks dropped. The alternatives—that no one is
deterred from sharing intimate media due to fears of unauthorized distribution, or that people create these images or photos
because they are attracted to the risk—are unlikely. We lack
reliable data on intimate media production and distribution beyond crude demographic measures: how often people in various
136
age or gender cohorts sext, for example. This is likely because
sharing of intimate media has only recently been viewed as
something acceptable rather than taboo.
However, as a policy matter, copyright rarely requires certainty that infringement damages production before acting. For
example, the effects of Internet-based file-sharing, such as via
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, on authors’ incentives to produce
works such as sound recordings and motion pictures are unclear, and indeed highly contested. Felix Oberholzer-Gee and
Koleman Strumpf published a 2010 study suggesting that
while infringement via P2P networks may account for as much
as 20% of the decline in music sales, incentives to produce re137
main largely unaffected. They note that in the face of widespread on-line infringement, the “publication of new books rose
by 66% over 2002-7”; and “[s]ince 2000, the annual release of
new music albums has more than doubled, and worldwide fea138
ture film production is up by more than 30% since 2003.”
134. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10; Silvestrini, supra note 126; Alexa
Tsoulis-Reay, A Brief History of Revenge Porn, N.Y. MAG. (July 21, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/sex/revenge-porn-2013-7.
135. See supra note 43.
136. See, e.g., Melissa Fleschler Peskin et al., Prevalence and Patterns of
Sexting Among Ethnic Minority Urban High School Students, 16
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAVIOR & SOC. NETWORKING 454 (2013).
137. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File Sharing and Copyright, in 10 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 19 (Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11764.pdf.
138. Id. at 20.
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Looking simply at sales of media (rather than authorial incentives), the authors find that the aggregate evidence is mixed:
the majority of studies find file-sharing reduces sales; an important minority finds no effect; and two studies even find a
139
positive correlation between file-sharing and sales. Other authors find greater harm from file-sharing. Michael Smith and
Rahul Telang review empirical studies of infringement’s impact
140
and state that the majority conclude it harms sales. A study
by George Baker using Industry Canada data found that a 10%
increase in P2P downloading reduces CD sales by roughly
141
Does Internet infringement affect the production of
0.4%.
music recordings and motion pictures? The evidence is unclear.
Yet governments did not hesitate to act in the face of uncertainty. Copyright protections in the United States, and
worldwide, have steadily ratcheted up during the file-sharing
142
era. Indeed, some U.S. legislation and precedent has been explicitly designed to target on-line infringement. The 1997 No
Electronic Theft Act increased statutory damages for infringement and reduced the threshold for criminal copyright liabil143
ity. The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in MGM v. Grokster
recognized a new theory of secondary copyright liability target144
ed at distributed P2P systems such as KaZaa. The PRO IP
Act of 2008 augmented criminal penalties for copyright infringement and set up a new Intellectual Property Enforcement
145
Representative (dubbed the “IP czar” ) within the executive
146
branch to combat infringement. Recently, the administration
of President Barack Obama began seizing domain names of
139. Id. at 35.
140. Michael D. Smith & Rahul Telang, Assessing the Academic Literature
Regarding the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (unpublished manuscript)
(Aug. 19, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132153.
141. See Barry Sookman, The Andersen P2P File Sharing Study on the
Purchase of Music CDs in Canada, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/08/20/the-andersen-p2p-file-sharing-study
-on-the-purchase-of-music-cds-in-canada.
142. Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, supra note 137, at 20.
143. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997).
144. MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
145. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Obama “IP Czar” Wants Felony Charges for
Illegal Web Streaming, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/03/obama-ip-czar-wants-felony-charges-for
-illegal-web-streaming.
146. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act
of 2008, Pub. L. 110-403, §§ 201, 301, 122 Stat. 4256.
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websites accused of infringement using ex parte civil forfeiture
147
148
orders. The wisdom of these efforts is debatable. What is
clear is that the U.S. government moved rapidly to augment
copyright based on intuition, later backed with some data, that
infringement was harming production of copyrighted works. So,
too, the negative effects of non-consensual distribution of intimate media need not be proved with perfection before copyright
moves to deal with them.
Lastly, alternative proposals for dealing with the nonconsensual distribution of intimate media would almost cer149
tainly reduce production, an undesirable result. This is because many of these proposals attack production itself, not
merely unauthorized distribution. Eric Goldman, for example,
advises “individuals who would prefer not to be a revenge porn
victim or otherwise have intimate depictions of themselves publicly disclosed, the advice will be simple: don’t take nude photos
150
or videos.” There is a wealth of similar advice in popular me151
dia. For scholars and commentators alike, the typical answer
to non-consensual distribution is for people to avoid creating intimate media in the first place. Thus, in the absence of a copyright-based approach, and even with the adoption of alternative
147. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 885–
86 (2012).
148. See, e.g., id.; Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83
B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003); Nicolas Suzor & Brian Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of
Graduated Response Schemes in Copyright Law, 34 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1
(2011).
149. See, e.g., Nicole A. Poltash, Note, Snapchat and Sexting: A Snapshot of
Baring Your Bare Essentials, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, ¶¶ 42–44 (2013) (advocating education programs to reduce sexting and restrictions that prevent minors from using Snapchat).
150. Eric Goldman, What Should We Do About Revenge Porn Sites Like
Texxxan?, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 9, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2013/02/what_should_we.htm.
151. See, e.g., Sasha Brown-Worsham, 8 Sexting Rules to Avoid Starring
Naked in Someone’s ‘Revenge Porn,’ STIR (Apr. 6, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://thestir
.cafemom.com/love_sex/135696/8_sexting_rules_to_avoid; Jessica G., Revenge
Porn: Hard to Prosecute, Harder on the Psyche, JEZEBEL (Oct. 1, 2008, 1:20
PM), http://jezebel.com/5057511/revenge-porn-hard-to-prosecute-harder-on-the
-psyche; Lauren Holliday, Keep Your Pixels in Your Pants; Don’t Sext, CENT.
FL. FUTURE (June 15, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.centralfloridafuture.com/
keep-your-pixels-in-your-pants-don-t-sext-1.2600443; Jessica Janner, Revenge
Porn Ruining Reputations with the Click of a Mouse, KTNV.COM (May 16,
2013), http://www.ktnv.com/news/local/207747941.html; Gil Kaufman, How
Can You Avoid Sexting Dangers?, MTV.COM (Feb. 12, 2010, 2:51 PM), http://
www.mtv.com/news/articles/1631759/how-can-avoid-sexting-dangers.jhtml.
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proposals, we will likely forgo the real and significant benefits
that accrue to partners who consensually employ these materi152
als.
II. STATUTORY PROPOSAL
The Article now offers an IP-based proposal to encourage
the consensual production and distribution of intimate media.
This Section opens with an explanation of why intellectual
property law—specifically, copyright law—is the optimal tool
for this issue. Then, it lays out the specifics of the proposed
statute, which would add a new section to the Copyright Act.
A. WHY COPYRIGHT?
Copyright law holds considerable potential to address the
promise and problems of intimate media. The task at hand—
encouraging production of consensual media, while constraining sharing without permission—is precisely that for which in153
tellectual property rules are designed.
The difficulties of
checking unauthorized sharing, which inhere in the dramatically reduced costs of creating and distributing information, are
the difficulties of IP enforcement in the networked digital
154
era.
Copyright has several further benefits. First, IP law is
principally private law: rights and liabilities are worked out by
155
the parties at interest. While the government provides the forum to resolve disputes, it is generally not otherwise a participant. This removes the resource constraint that public law imposes: there are only so many prosecutors, and each can only
156
handle a docket of a certain size. Prosecutorial constraints
152. Even Eric Goldman, whose advice is to refrain from producing intimate images or videos, acknowledges the trend: “between sexting and sex
tapes, far more private pornography is being generated than at any point in
human history.” Goldman, supra note 17. Goldman suggests that, in time,
norms regarding this material will shift. Id. Changes in law, though, can usefully drive changes in norms. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 666, 672–75 (1998).
153. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 330–31.
154. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349
(2004) (describing copyright owners as “under threat from a flood of cheap,
easy copies and a dramatic increase in the number of people who can make
those copies”).
155. But see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
156. See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual
Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 516 (2011) (discussing lim-
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limit significantly the scale of enforcement under IP’s public
law regime. The federal government, for example, brings only a
relative handful of criminal intellectual property cases each
157
year, and half of those result in no jail time for defendants.
Private enforcement is more broadly available to victims of infringement than public enforcement. The availability of statutory damages under copyright helps make private litigation
feasible, despite its costs. While public enforcement has countervailing benefits, such as the ability to deter judgment-proof
violators through imprisonment, and the stigma that attaches
to criminal sanctions, those do not seem worth the cost in abso158
lute enforcement levels.
Second, IP offers useful mechanisms for addressing technical problems implicit in regulating intimate media, particularly with a scheme of overlapping rights. Intellectual property
doctrine is perfectly comfortable with the concept of multiple,
shared claims in a protected work of information: joint author159
ship in copyright, joint inventorship in patent, the independ160
ent invention defense in trade secret, and parallel use in dif161
ferent markets in trademark law,
among others. This
Article’s solution contemplates a regime with multiple people
who have claims to aspects of copyright in intimate media.
Copyright has already achieved working systems of overlapping
162
rights in areas such as sound recordings (derivative works of

its on prosecutorial resources).
157. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT: ANNUAL REPORT FY2012, at 31
(Dec. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/dag/iptaskforce/proipact/doj-pro-iprpt2012
.pdf (listing fewer than 200 IP cases, and fewer than 250 defendants sentenced, per year from 2008–2012). To put this number in context, in 2009, 223
defendants were sentenced in IP cases, and more than half (126) received no
prison term. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2009, at 13 (Dec. 2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
The same year, 25,874 defendants were convicted on federal drug charges, and
78.2% received prison sentences. Id.
158. See Manta, supra note 156, at 472.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2012) (defining joint inventions).
160. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437
(1990 & Supp. 2005) (defining “[d]iscovery by independent invention” as proper means of obtaining a trade secret).
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (permitting concurrent use registration); see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.04 (discussing concurrent use).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). See generally Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d
591 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing liability where rap group Beastie Boys licensed
composition, but not sound recording).
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their underlying musical compositions), joint authorship, and
the moral rights accorded by the Visual Artists Rights Act
164
(VARA).
Moreover, copyright law has helped ameliorate problems of
substantiating harm to an acceptable quantum of proof through
an administrative schedule of copyright damages, intended
both to ensure rough compensation to injured owners and to
165
deter infringers who might otherwise escape liability. Here,
too, the proposed reform employs statutory damages to the
same end. Harms from unauthorized sharing of intimate media
are real, but may be difficult to reduce to a specific pecuniary
figure with sufficient rigor. Finally, American IP rights are
generally alienable, under various levels of formality: copyright
entitlements, for example, can be licensed non-exclusively
based on mere oral agreement, whereas an assignment of the
same rights requires a written agreement signed by the own166
er. The proposal advanced in this Article permits consensual
167
distribution when validated by a written agreement. This
comports with the general skepticism towards inalienable
168
rights in American copyright doctrine.
Third, using IP law effectively addresses issues with intimate media within the existing statutory framework for Internet intermediaries. Other approaches, such as privacy-based
ones, would need to alter the contours of the immunity for in163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (2012) (defining “joint work” and ownership of
copyright by joint authors, respectively).
164. Id. § 106A.
165. Id. § 504(c); see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 439, 446–63 (2009) (discussing relevant damages).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012); see Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding oral agreement did not transfer copyright in light of 17
U.S.C. § 204(a), but holding agreement created non-exclusive license).
167. The waiver provision ensures that consensually created pornography,
whether professional or amateur, can continue unabated. Creators need only
obtain written consent from participants. Porn producers are already familiar
with similar contractual and recordkeeping requirements necessitated by the
participants’ rights of publicity and by federal age verification requirements,
among other regimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2012); see also Perfect 10 v. CCBill
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10 is the publisher of the
eponymous adult entertainment magazine and the owner of the website, perfect10.com. . . . Many of the models in these [pornographic] images have signed
releases assigning their rights of publicity to Perfect 10.”).
168. See, e.g., Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1519, 1525–26 (2011) (discussing how American authors have greater protection of their moral rights abroad than in the United States).
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teractive computer services from third-party liability created by
169
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Section 230
immunizes intermediaries, such as search engines and websites, from most tort and state criminal law liability for content
170
provided by third parties. Some of these proposals would not
171
merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it. This is undesirable. Section 230 has been critical to the development of a
thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content supplied
172
by users. Forcing intermediaries to filter their platforms proactively for potentially suspect content would create significant
173
costs and inefficiencies. Helpfully, however, Section 230 ex174
plicitly exempts intellectual property law from its ambit.
Thus, this Article’s reform co-exists easily with Section 230.
And, Internet intermediaries are familiar with analogous provisions of Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), which condition immunity on compliance with a notice-and-takedown system for material allegedly infringing
175
copyright. It should be straightforward for Internet firms to
implement the proposed notice-and-takedown system for non176
consensual distribution of intimate media as well.
Lastly, IP law is accustomed to First Amendment balancing. Scholars have rightly complained that doctrines such as
trademark’s fair use defense and copyright’s durational chang-

169. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 13; Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 124 (2009).
172. Eric Goldman, Unregulating Online Harassment, 57 DENV. U. L.
REV. ONLINE 59 (2010) [hereinafter Goldman, Unregulating], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558681; Mark A. Lemley,
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101
(2007); Eric Goldman, The Implications of Excluding State Crimes from 47
U.S.C. § 230’s Immunity 4 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 23, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2287622.
173. See Lemley supra note 172, at 102–03 (discussing liability of ISPs engaging in filtering).
174. Circuit courts of appeal are split on whether the exception, at 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012), applies to state intellectual property law, or only
federal law. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding exception applies only to federal IP laws), with Universal
Commc’n Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 423 n.7 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating exception applies to state and federal IP law).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g)(2) (2012). See generally Ardia, supra note 24.
176. See Franks, supra note 3, at 657.
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177

es are insufficiently attentive to free speech concerns. Yet,
the free speech issue is one to which attention is (and must be)
178
paid in IP law. Thus, IP offers examples of how to accommodate free speech limitations within a doctrinal framework, such
as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use in copyright
179
law, and the newsworthiness exception to the right of publici180
ty. Other information regulation schemes, such as securities
181
laws, tend to ignore First Amendment concerns. This Article
builds on copyright’s scheme by proposing that a defendant be
immunized from liability where the unconsented distribution of
182
the intimate images or video was newsworthy.
In short, IP law holds under-recognized potential to regulate intimate media. The next subsections describe the contours
of the proposed statutory reform.
B. A NEW COPYRIGHT ENTITLEMENT
The production and distribution of media capturing intimacy is best addressed by adding a new section, 17 U.S.C.
183
§ 106B, to the Copyright Act. The purpose of 106B is to create
a new form of copyright infringement: distribution or display of
intimate media, from which a living person captured in it can
be identified, without the written consent of that person. Put
177. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1057 (2001); William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90
B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010).
178. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082 (2013) [hereinafter Netanel,
First Amendment Constraints].
179. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012).
180. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir.
2009).
181. These laws may increasingly be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing misbranding conviction under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); see also Jane Bambauer,
Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2013).
182. Such distributions will, one suspects, rarely be newsworthy. One possible counterexample concerns the dispute between attorney Dwayne Beck
and a pseudonymous plaintiff. Beck sent a photo of his penis to the plaintiff
via e-mail, allegedly after propositioning her and rubbing himself against her;
she responded with a lawsuit. Distribution of the photo (if Beck could be identified from it) might succeed under a newsworthiness defense. See Debra
Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Wins Court Order to Remove Explicit Photo from Court
File, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
lawyer_wins_court_order_to_remove_explicit_photo_from_court_file.
183. The full text of the proposed statute is provided in Appendix A, infra.
The placement of the right after Section 106A suggests that, like 106A, the
new right is limited and does not apply to all types of copyrighted works.
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another way, the new provision invests in the identifiable subjects of intimate media the right to approve distribution or display of that media. Enforcement of the right would vary with
the type of defendant, who would be divided into natural persons and service providers. While available remedies would be
identical in both cases, service providers could avail themselves
of statutory immunity via compliance with a notice-and184
takedown system modeled on the DMCA. Remedies would include injunctive relief and, at the plaintiff’s election, either
statutory or actual damages. Defendants could escape liability
if the distribution were newsworthy, or if they obtained written
consent. This subsection next explores the contours of the new
right.
1. Subject Matter
The new 106B right would apply to a limited subset of pho185
tographs and audiovisual works. This subset would be called
“intimate media,” a defined term of art that would be added to
the Copyright Act’s built-in dictionary at 17 U.S.C. § 101. Intimate media would comprise photographs and audiovisual
works with four additional characteristics.
First, intimate media contain images of one or more living
humans. The term “intimate media” would cover accurate, authentic representations of living persons that capture their actual bodies.
Second, the plaintiff is one of the living persons captured in
the intimate media.
Third, the plaintiff can reasonably be identified from the
media, or from the combination of the intimate media and iden186
tifying information presented along with it. To meet this requirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that a reasonable
person viewing the media would believe that the plaintiff was
184. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g) (2012).
185. Audiovisual work is expressly defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). “Photograph” is not a defined term, but is included within copyright’s subject matter as a component of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which are also
defined in Section 101. See id.
186. See, e.g., Meredith Bennett-Smith, Hollie Toups Leads Women in Revenge Porn Class Action Lawsuit Against Texxxan.com, GoDaddy,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/
hollie-toups-leads-women-suing-revenge-porn-site-texxxan-go-daddy_n_25460
66.html (noting that Hollie Toups’s ex-boyfriend posted nude photos of her
that were accompanied by her real name and Facebook profile); cf. 18 U.S.C. §
2256(9) (2012) (defining “identifiable minor”).
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captured in it, and could be identified, such as via display of facial features, identifying marks (such as distinctive tattoos or
birthmarks), labels, or accompanying text.
Fourth, the media captures “intimate information,” which
would be defined in Section 101 as sexually explicit conduct in187
188
volving the plaintiff, or the plaintiff’s genitals, pubic area,
189
190
or (if female ) exposed nipple or areola.
The new right’s coverage would be limited to photographic
or audiovisual works that capture the plaintiff in a state of
graphic nudity or sexual conduct, and that permit the plaintiff
to be identified.
2. Rights Created
Any person identifiably captured in intimate media, where
that media meets the subject matter requirements outlined
above with respect to that person, would enjoy the right to prevent distribution and display of that media. Thus, Section 106B
would expressly alter sections 106(3) and 106(5) of the Copyright Act, which govern the exclusive rights of distribution and
191
public display of a copyrighted work. Those rights are enjoyed
initially by the author of a work—typically, in the case of pho187. The proposed statute, see infra Appendix A, would define “sexually
explicit conduct” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(i), (ii).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(f)(3) (2012) (defining “graphic” as, inter alia,
meaning “a viewer can observe any part of the genitals or pubic area of any
depicted person”).
189. The proposed statute, infra Appendix A, plainly provides female subjects with a greater entitlement than male subjects—that is, their permission
is required to distribute intimate media that captures their exposed nipples or
areolas, while such consent is not needed from males. Some state courts have
held conceptually similar statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v.
Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (1992) (striking down indecent exposure statute that
applied to display of female, but not male, breasts). While the question is not
free from doubt, this Article argues that the proposed reform would survive
constitutional scrutiny in federal courts. See generally Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender-specific California statutory rape law against equal protection challenge); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (upholding the same for private insurance via
employer); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding state’s denial of unemployment insurance to pregnant women did not discriminate based on gender).
190. This requirement would certainly cover the popular Girls Gone Wild
video series. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. MRA
Holdings, LLC, No. 5:06CR79/RS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://
news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/pornlaw/dfrprosmra91206.html. Cultural sacrifices
must be made.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5) (2012).
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tographs, the photographer, and in case of audiovisual works,
either the director or producer (though the right may expand to
192
include other joint authors). Section 106B would curtail the
distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright owner
of intimate media: exercise of those rights would be subject to
the consent of each subject of that media who is identifiable
and who is captured naked or engaged in sexually explicit con193
duct.
Moreover, the new 106B would apply to private display as
well as public. Copyright law distinguishes between public displays, such as showing a movie in a theater or hanging a painting in a museum, and private displays, such as watching a
movie with one’s family or showing a photograph to a friend.
This proposal expands the 106B right beyond the normal 106(5)
194
right, which applies only to public displays.
Thus, 106B
would also expressly modify Section 109(c), which permits the
195
owners of lawfully made copies to display them publicly. The
expansion of control to private display is necessary, given the
nature of these photos and images, and the potential chilling
effect of infringement. Showing intimate media to family and
social acquaintances may work nearly as great a harm as wider
distribution. Like copyright’s other entitlements, the new 106B
right attaches to each copy of the intimate media. Thus, a
plaintiff could enforce her right against anyone possessing such
a copy, not merely against the copyright owner.
The 106B right would be waivable in writing, but not alienable. This part of 106B is analogous to the rights of attribu196
tion and integrity under Section 106A (implementing VARA).
192. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000).
193. There is precedent for limiting distribution rights based on the production needs of an industry. The Record Rental Amendment of 1984 removed
the first sale privilege of renting or leasing phonorecords for purposes of commercial gain, even when the owner has lawfully obtained the phonorecord.
Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012)). The
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 performed a similar
change for computer programs. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012)).
194. “Public display” is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). Such a change is not without precedent.
17 U.S.C. § 109(d) removes the privilege from holders of copies who do not
have ownership—those who have acquired it from the copyright owner via
rental, lease, or loan, for example—unless they obtain authorization from the
copyright holder.
196. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5132
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012)).
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Like VARA, the 106B right would be held by the subject(s) of
the intimate media, and not by the copyright owner of the work
197
(though, of course, the subjects may also be owners). And,
like VARA’s provisions, the 106B right could be waived by a
subject if that person expressly agreed, in a signed writing, to
198
the waiver. Waivers of 106B rights would work differently
from typical copyright licenses, which can be in oral form if the
199
license is non-exclusive. Here, oral waivers would be ineffective. (Oral waivers would present nearly insurmountable problems of proof for plaintiffs.) Unlike VARA, though, the 106B
right is exclusive to each subject who meets the requirements
outlined above; a waiver by one such subject has no effect on
200
the rights of others. To be operative, the waiver would have
to reasonably identify the intimate media that it covered, to
avoid the risk of a blanket license. The waiver also could be
limited temporally, by medium (for example, still images, but
not video), or by recipient.
Finally, 106B would include a statutory waiver: a person
who received intimate media from an identifiable person captured in it would not be liable, to that person, for viewing that
media him or herself. For example, if Marge sent a nude photo
of herself to Homer, Homer would be immune from 106B infringement liability for viewing the photo himself. He could not,
however, show the photo or give it to Moe without incurring liability. For intimate media featuring multiple subjects, the
waiver would apply if the recipient received it from any of
them. This concededly creates some residual risk for the subject
of such photos and videos—if, in the future, they no longer wish
the recipient to have the media (as when a romantic relationship ends, for example), they have no power under this new
provision to compel that outcome. The residual risk seems
manageable, though. Relationships that end often involve former partners possessing sensitive material: love letters, roman201
tic gifts, mixtapes, and the like. People are accustomed to this
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (2012).
198. See id. § 106A(e)(1).
199. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
200. Contrast this approach with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (“[I]n the case of a
joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this paragraph made by one such author waives such rights for all such authors.”). See
generally Grauer v. Deutsch, No. 01CIV.8672(LAK), 2002 WL 31288937, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2002) (“Congress plainly meant [in VARA] for any one of
two or more coauthors to bind the others by waiving attribution rights.”).
201. See Filipovic, supra note 65.
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risk. Lastly, ongoing viewing of the media is limited to the recipient—further display or distribution violates the new
202
right. The statutory waiver that enables the recipient to view
the intimate media without obtaining consent creates a small
residual risk, but avoids the perils of a “right to be forgotten”
203
for such content.
3. Infringement
The new 106B right would be infringed whenever someone
distributed or displayed the intimate media in which the identi204
fiable subject (the plaintiff) is featured. For example, forwarding a sexted, nude photo without the written consent of
the person featured in it (where the person could be identified)
205
would infringe that person’s 106B right. So would displaying
206
the original photo to anyone other than the original recipient.
Formally, a cause of action for infringement of the 106B right
would require that the plaintiff establish five elements: (1) the
content at issue qualifies as intimate media; (2) she was captured in that intimate media; (3) a reasonable person would believe she could be identified from it or in combination with accompanying information; (4) the media contains intimate
information of the plaintiff; and (5) the defendant displayed or
207
distributed it. Distribution would include making the image
or video available to others, and would not necessitate proving
208
that anyone else actually obtained access to it.
202. Another way to view this immunity is to conceive of 106B as redefining “public,” for the purposes of public display, as anyone other than a
person who directly receives intimate media from the subject. On this account,
106B would impose liability only for public displays of intimate media, but the
scope of public display would widen considerably. See infra Appendix A.
203. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 88 (2012) (criticizing concept); Jane Yakowitz, More Bad Ideas
from the E.U., FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 3:57PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2012/01/25/more-bad-ideas-from-the-e-u (criticizing concept).
204. As discussed below, someone who received the work of intimate media
from a subject of it could view that work him/herself, but could not otherwise
distribute, display, or perform it. See infra Appendix A.
205. See infra Appendix A.
206. See infra Appendix A.
207. See infra Appendix A; see also supra Part II.B.1 (defining intimate information).
208. See infra Appendix A. Courts are split on whether violation of the Section 106(3) distribution right requires actual distribution, or merely making a
copy available. Compare Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 991
F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (infringing distribution right requires actual distribution), with Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d
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The statute would, however, separate defendants into two
209
camps: natural persons, and service providers. For natural
persons, infringing activity would include the usual modes of
distribution (uploading videos or images to a Web server, emailing them, texting them, etc.) and of display (showing media
files to others). For service providers, distribution would in210
clude hosting, linking to, or caching intimate media.
Infringement liability would apply only to intimate media
created after the effective date of the legislation implementing
the new 106B right. There are several rationales for limiting
106B’s temporal application. First, the new copyright entitlement is not necessary to generate production of existing inti211
mate media, and there are no (thinly) plausible justifications
for retroactivity such as restoration or renewed distribution of
212
extant works. Second, requiring written consent for distribution of existing media creates potentially significant transaction costs: the person holding the image or video may have obtained verbal consent initially, but must now locate anyone
213
identifiable in the media to gain written permission. This second negotiation might be useful in the privacy context, but in
214
the copyright arena, it creates deadweight loss. The normative justifications for the proposed reform simply do not support
retroactive application.

199 (4th Cir. 1997) (making copyrighted works available for distribution suffices to infringe). See generally Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost
Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 1 (2011).
209. “Service provider” would be any entity meeting the DMCA definition
at 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2012).
210. Hosting, linking to, and caching media would be defined with reference to the DMCA: 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (d), and (b), respectively.
211. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 257 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing retroactive extension of copyright term because “in respect to
works already created—the source of many of the harms previously described—the statute creates no economic incentive at all”).
212. Id. at 207 (upholding extension on grounds, inter alia, “that longer
terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works”).
213. Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at 332, 355 (discussing transaction
cost implications of copyright’s allocation of entitlements).
214. Cf. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1613–14 (1982) (discussing solutions, such as compulsory licensing or
fair use, to transaction cost problems in markets for copyrighted works).
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4. Remedies
The remedies available to a successful plaintiff would be
those for copyright infringement generally, but with a safe harbor available to service providers.
A prevailing plaintiff could obtain both damages and injunctive relief. Damages would follow copyright’s established
system: the plaintiff could elect actual damages, or statutory
damages at the customary copyright rate of $750–30,000 per
215
infringing image or audiovisual work. A plaintiff seeking to
minimize litigation costs could opt for a statutory damages
award of $750 per work, avoiding the need for a jury to deter216
mine the amount of damages. Enhanced damages (up to a
maximum of $150,000) could be awarded where the plaintiff
217
proved willful infringement. A finding of willful infringement
would also generate a rebuttable presumption in favor of
awarding costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) to the
218
prevailing plaintiff. This cost-shifting presumption would enhance plaintiffs’ ability to obtain counsel, while cabining the
award of fees to cases where the infringer knew that their ac219
tions infringed, or recklessly disregarded such a risk. Where

215. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012). The burden of apportionment on actual
damages would mirror that under the Copyright Act, where the plaintiff
proves gross revenues, and the defendant must prove offsetting costs. 17
U.S.C. § 504(b). The potentially significant amount of statutory damages creates another rationale for prospective application of § 106B—notice to potential infringers is vital to the constitutionality of the damages scheme. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012); Sony
BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 513 (1st Cir. 2011).
216. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding no right to jury trial when plaintiff sought only minimum amount of
statutory damages).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). See generally Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342–44 (1998); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v.
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2013).
218. This would alter 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012), which leaves cost and fee
awards to the trial court’s discretion. See generally Lieb v. Topstone Indus.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3rd Cir. 1986) (describing factors used in the Third
Circuit to evaluate award of fees). Under this proposal, a court would be instructed to make such an award to all prevailing plaintiffs in cases of willful
infringement of the new right, unless the court found (supported by specific
findings) that the interests of justice necessitated otherwise. The Copyright
Act establishes similar presumptions or mandates for award of enhanced
damages under certain circumstances. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3)(A), (d)
(discussing the presumption and mandate, respectively).
219. I thank Dave Marcus for this suggestion, while noting he preferred to
award costs to all prevailing plaintiffs.
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the trial court, applying the standard equitable analysis,
awarded injunctive relief, it would presumptively include removal of all infringing on-line intimate media under the defendant’s control, and destruction of all such infringing physical
221
media under his control.
A service provider defendant would face the same slate of
remedies. However, relief would be limited by a statutory im222
munity. To qualify for immunity, a service provider would
have to follow the notice and take-down system established under 106B. The provider would remain immune until it received
a take-down notification as defined below for the intimate media in suit. After receiving the take-down notification, the service provider could maintain immunity by disabling access to
223
the infringing media within five business days of receipt.
Taking down the content after notification would protect the
service provider against a claim for damages by the identifiable
subject of the intimate media. And, the service provider would
obtain immunity against suit by the uploader or distributor of
the images by notifying that person of the take-down, if the
service provider had information sufficient to complete the noti224
fication. Thus, a service provider would lose the benefit of the
safe harbor if it received a take-down notification and failed to
disable access to infringing media, or if it failed to notify the
uploader/distributor, if possible, after receiving a take-down no225
tification. If the service provider remained within the safe
220. See generally eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
221. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012) (providing for impoundment and destruction of infringing works).
222. The immunity is a safe harbor, not a defense: the burden of production
lies upon the plaintiff initially. Cf. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 2d 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing how plaintiff Viacom had the
burden to show defendant’s knowledge or awareness of specific infringements).
223. By default, notification would be directed to the DMCA agent for the
service provider, although the provider could designate a separate agent for
this purpose, if the information were made available in the same location as
the DMCA agent information. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2012); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Directory of Service Provider Agents for Notification of Claims
of Infringement, http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/a_agents.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
224. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (discussing liability and exceptions). This
statutory immunity will often be unnecessary, since service providers can protect themselves via contract. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YOUTUBE § 10 (June
9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (providing limitations of liability);
see also id. § 6(F) (“YouTube reserves the right to remove Content without prior notice.”).
225. This scheme mirrors that for service providers under 17 U.S.C. § 512.
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harbor’s immunity, it would not be liable for monetary damages, and would be liable for injunctive relief only on the same
terms as under the DMCA: compelling it to cease providing access to infringing material or activity, to terminate the account
of an identified infringer, or to take other action to prevent in226
fringement at a particular on-line location.
Similarly, the
service provider would receive immunity from liability to the
poster or uploader of the material if that provider notified the
poster and, on receipt of a counter-notification certifying that
the work was distributed with consent or was newsworthy, restored access to that work.
Lastly, the legislation implementing 106B would remove
the three-month deadline for registering copyrighted works (after first publication) to qualify for statutory damages under
227
this new right. Congress implemented this deadline, part of
the 1976 Copyright Act, as an incentive for authors to register
their works (since the 1976 Act removed registration as a pre228
requisite for obtaining copyright). But timely registration of
amateur, non-commercial media such as intimate photos and
videos is highly unlikely. And, removing statutory damages as
a remedy effectively denies copyright relief to anyone except a
plaintiff able to afford counsel at an hourly rate. With statutory
damages, a victim of unauthorized distribution may be able to
find an attorney willing to press her claim for a share of the recovery. By maintaining statutory damages as a viable option,
the new 106B right makes relief practically as well as theoretically available to those injured by the infringement of non229
consensual distribution.
5. Takedown System
The remedy scheme outlined above creates incentives for
service providers to disable access to allegedly infringing material upon receipt of a takedown notification. To transmit a successful takedown notification, the plaintiff would submit the
following information in writing (such as by e-mail) to the service provider:
The plaintiff is a person captured in the intimate media at
issue;
226.
227.
228.
(1976).
229.

See id. § 512(j).
See 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012).
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451
I thank Brent White for this point.
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The plaintiff could reasonably be expected to be identified
based on the media, or information accompanying it;
The media contains intimate information;
The plaintiff did not consent to distribution of the media at
issue in writing, or if she did consent, this distribution exceeds
the express scope of that consent;
The plaintiff’s name and contact information, including an
e-mail address; or, if proceeding pseudonymously, the plaintiff’s
unique identifier and court identification information;
The URLs or locations under the service provider’s control
where the infringing media can be located; and
A statement that the plaintiff signs this takedown notification under penalty of perjury.
The statute would require that service providers redact
identifying information from takedown notifications before
sharing them outside the provider’s organization, including
230
with websites such as Chilling Effects. In addition, it would
mandate that providers keep notifications confidential within
their organizations, including by minimizing the number of
people with access to them.
Submitting identifying information can be risky for some
plaintiffs, such as victims of revenge porn who face threats of
231
violence or stalking. The statute would provide that a plaintiff can seek an ex parte judicial order allowing her to proceed
pseudonymously, including with an e-mail account created for
this purpose. The order could be issued for cause, broadly defined, and would include a unique identifier. Upon issuance,
the plaintiff would include a statement about the order in her
takedown notification, with the contact information for the
court and the unique identifier. The clerk of court would be authorized to respond to requests from service providers to verify
the veracity of the order, but not to provide the plaintiff’s actual
identifying information.
Falsified takedown notifications represent a potential problem with the 106B system. Plaintiffs could conceivably issue
notifications for intimate media for which they had authorized
distribution, or perhaps for other media to which they objected
(for example, anti-pornography activists might target the Girls
230. See infra Appendix A. Chilling Effects, for example, permits but does
not require submissions to keep identifying information private. See C&D Entry Form, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/copyright/submit
.cgi?TriggerID=5 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
231. See, e.g., Roy, supra note 23 (describing cyberstalking of Holly Jacobs).
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232

Gone Wild videos). The statute would incorporate measures
to deter false notifications. It would provide that anyone who
knowingly submits a 106B notification with material, false information would be liable to the service provider for either the
provider’s actual damages, or statutory damages of $750 per
image or audiovisual work, at the provider’s election. A material, false submission would also relieve the provider of any obligation to disable access to the allegedly infringing content. Finally, the person submitting the materially false takedown
notice would be liable to the person who uploaded or distributed the media at issue for that person’s actual damages created
by the notice. The risk of penalties for a falsified takedown
might deter people from using the system, but the combination
of scienter requirement, materiality requirement, and need to
deter strategic behavior suggests that the benefits from this
233
precaution outweigh its harms.
6. Defenses
Two defenses to liability would be available (in addition to
the immunity for service providers described above). The burden of proof for them would rest upon the defendant.
First, written consent to distribution or display signed by
the person appearing in the media would operate as a defense
for both types of defendants against claims by that person. Logistically, it might be difficult for service providers to determine whether such consent had been obtained, since they
might have no contact with the original distributor of the intimate media, who would presumably have obtained the written
consent. However, the immunity under the new takedown system mitigates this concern.
Second, to honor the First Amendment’s requirements, the
statute would provide a complete defense for newsworthy unconsented distribution or display of intimate media. Defining
what is “newsworthy” is a non-trivial hurdle; the statute (or, at
least, the legislative history) could incorporate the common law
232. Cf. John Timmer, Site Plagiarizes Blog Posts, Then Files DMCA
Takedown on Originals, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/science/2013/02/site-plagiarizes-blog-posts-then-files-dmca
-takedown-on-originals (describing falsified DMCA takedown).
233. This is particularly so since the equivalent provision under the
DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012), has been interpreted to be generous to defendants. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, 391 F.3d 1000, 1003–
06 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring subjective bad faith on part of defendant to impose § 512(f) liability).
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234

precedent developed for the privacy torts. The statute should
also establish that newsworthiness varies with subject matter,
not subject: the issue must be a matter of public concern, not
merely that the subject is a public figure. There is no principled
basis to offer celebrities or politicians less protection against
235
revenge porn.
As a practical matter, it seems that nonconsensual distribution of intimate media will rarely qualify as
newsworthy, though politicians who engage in sexting are a dif236
ficult edge case. For example, former New York representative Anthony Weiner resigned from Congress when it was revealed that he had sent explicit photos to a half-dozen women
237
who were not his wife. After two years away from politics,
Weiner launched a campaign to become mayor of New York
238
239
City, framing himself as recovered and repentant. Although
Weiner enjoyed strong support in early polling, that support
collapsed when gossip site The Dirty revealed a new wave of
240
sexts that Weiner had sent over the past year. At least the
second set of sexts would seem to qualify for the newsworthi234. This exception is also framed in terms of whether a disclosure is of legitimate concern to the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1977). See generally Bambauer, supra note 87, at 266 (noting the “exemption
[is] much bemoaned by privacy scholars as the exception that swallows the
rule”). On the privacy torts, see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010) and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010).
235. Celebrities tend to fare poorly with privacy claims in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Evan Brown, Court Won’t Ban Gawker from Posting Hulk
Hogan Sex Tape, INTERNETCASES (Nov. 17, 2012), http://blog.internetcases
.com/2012/11/17/court-wont-ban-gawker-from-posting-hulk-hogan-sex-tape
(denying injunction in suit by Hogan over sex tape filmed, and distributed,
without his consent).
236. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, Local New Jersey Politician Resigns Amid
Sexting Scandal, NPR (Aug. 3, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
thetwo-way/2011/08/03/138948566/local-new-jersey-politician-resigns-amid
-sexting-scandal; Weiner Resigns From Congress over Sexting Scandal, FOX
NEWS (June 16, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/16/house
-dems-may-boot-weiner-from-committee.
237. Raymond Hernandez, In Chaotic Scene, Weiner Quits Seat in Scandal’s Wake, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A1.
238. See Domenico Montanaro & Alex Moe, Weiner Defiant as Polls Show
Him Fading in New York Mayor’s Race, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2013, 9:34 PM),
http://nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/weiner-defiant-as-polls-show-him-fading
-in-new-york-mayors-race-v19758464.
239. Jonathan Van Meter, The Post-Scandal Playbook, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 14, 2013, at MM24.
240. Jennifer Peltz, Anthony Weiner Faces Growing Calls to Drop out of
NYC Mayoral Bid over New Sexting Scandal, STAR TRIB., July 24, 2013,
http://startribune.com/politics/216708441.htm.
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ness exception. Weiner continued extramarital sharing of intimate media after leaving politics for that reason, making public
241
vows of redemption, and re-entering politics. Thus, the content of the media is directly relevant not only to a politician’s
campaign, but to his record and promises specifically addressed
to sharing of intimate media with people other than his spouse.
If any intimate media are newsworthy, the latest round of
Weiner photos would seem to be so.
242
Fair use would not apply to 106B. Fair use relieves an
accused infringer from liability if their activity is socially beneficial. Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, a court evaluating fair use must consider the purpose and character of the use
of the work, the nature of the work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effects of the use on markets
243
for the work. The newsworthiness defense covers some of the
same territory and addresses the First Amendment concerns
244
that fair use relieves. Fair use is also a poor fit with the copyright interests that 106B addresses. In particular, the critical
fourth factor in fair use—the effect of the use upon markets for
the copyrighted work—does not align at all. A major goal of
106B is to prevent unconsented commercialization of intimate
245
media. Infringement, by unauthorized distribution, develops
markets—but in a way antithetical to consensual production.
And, the purpose and character of the use (fair use’s first factor) is also largely irrelevant; the chilling effects for production
accrue regardless of purpose. Consider an artist who uses a
photograph of his naked partner in his artwork—perhaps he is
246
mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images with nude photos.
That display of the intimate photo is highly transformative,

241. Id.
242. See infra Part III.B.4. Fair use is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
243. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569 (1994) (discussing fair use in the context of parody).
244. But see Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178 (arguing that the fair use doctrine is not currently an effective First Amendment
safeguard).
245. Cf. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95–100 (2d Cir. 1987)
(rejecting fair use defense for biographer’s use of author’s unpublished letters).
246. See David Rosenberg, Soviet-Era Photography Mashups Make Propaganda Illicit, SLATE (July 3, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
behold/2013/07/03/roman_pyatkovka_soviet_photo_re_imagines_propaganda_
photography_and_illicit.html.
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pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair. But, this is
irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo displayed, regardless of its artsy surroundings. The possibility of
being involuntarily featured may dissuade her from posing for
the photo at all.
* * *
The new 17 U.S.C. § 106B would create a right for identifiable subjects of intimate media to prevent unauthorized distribution or display of those images or videos, backed by statutory
damages and injunctive relief, but leavened with immunity for
service providers following a takedown procedure and for any
defendant obtaining written consent or making newsworthy
248
use of the media.
III. THE PUZZLES OF INTIMATE MEDIA
Regulating intimate media via copyright law will bolster
the production of such works among consenting partners, and
will reduce unauthorized distribution and performance by
treating them as infringement. In addition to these practical
benefits, using copyright to protect intimate media has scholarly advantages as well. Doing so reveals new insights about a
key pair of copyright puzzles: defining the author of a copyrighted work, and balancing IP restrictions against First
Amendment protections for free speech. This Section explores
both areas.
A. AUTHORSHIP
[O]nce an action is recounted False . . this disjunction occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters his own death,
249
writing begins.
Who is the author of a copyrighted work, and why? If
250
adopted, the statutory proposal discussed above would confer
247. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“The more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”).
248. See infra Appendix A.
249. ROLAND BARTHES, THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR (Richard Howard
trans., 1967), available at https://wiki.brown.edu/confluence/download/
attachments/74858352/BarthesDeathOfTheAuthor.pdf.
250. See supra Part II; infra Appendix A.

2014]

EXPOSED

2071

a limited set of entitlements upon people captured in certain
intimate media. That proposal places this Article squarely in
the midst of a long-standing, contentious copyright debate
251
about the nature of authorship. It confers upon the subjects
of intimate media a new right of authorship. Both precedent
and scholarship have opposed expanding who qualifies as an
author, for a variety of reasons, and so this proposal is controversial. Perhaps unexpectedly, though, the production and distribution of intimate media cast new light on these debates, unsettling previous assumptions and revealing overlooked
doctrinal support for the proposal.
Defining authorship is critical for copyright law. The Copyright Act, and the Constitution’s IP Clause, limit the initial
252
grant of copyright entitlements to authors. While an author
may subsequently alienate these rights, she is copyright’s
253
prime mover: rights must vest initially in her. Copyright doctrine evinces a strong preference for locating a single author for
a work, sending courts on a determined search for its “master
254
mind.” A contributor asserting that her creative additions
255
merit status as joint author faces a stringent test. She must
prove that her contributions are independently copyrightable,
that she and other authors intended to merge their expression
into an indivisible whole, and that all intended to share in the
256
status of author. Whether due to the Romantic ideal of the
257
258
lone genius, to concern over transaction costs, or to faith in
251. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 72; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Mary
LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving
the Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001); Tushnet, supra note 28,
at 1030; Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 1323 (1996).
252. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (2012).
253. Cf. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, Bk. VIII, at 132 (R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye
trans., 1994) (C. 350 B.C.E.) (“[T]here is a time when there is a first movent
and a first moved, and another time when there is no such thing but only
something that is at rest . . . .”).
254. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884); see,
e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000); Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1018.
255. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”).
256. See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199–202 (2d Cir. 1998).
But see Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding contribution does not need to be independently copyrightable).
257. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1765–71 (2012) (discussing how authors’ works
are closely connected to their sense of self).
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259

private ordering to solve authorship, the doctrine is biased
towards a solo author.
Legal scholarship has long fought over the proper scope of
260
authorship. Recent efforts typically begin by noting the continued primacy of the single author despite shifts towards col261
262
laborative efforts. Some scholars, such as Peter Jaszi and
263
Michael Carroll, advocate for doctrinal or statutory shifts
that take account of multiple contributors. Others, such as Amy
Adler, follow postmodern literary theory to deprecate authorship altogether, and to encourage the recoding, modification,
264
and even destruction of works of art. Yet others, such as Roberta Kwall, argue that the authorial voice is undesirably depre265
cated in copyright jurisprudence. Finally, Rebecca Tushnet
defends the current preference for solo authorship on grounds
that “[m]anageability, at this point in our copyright history,
may be more beneficial than a regime that claims to protect
266
every instance of creativity.”
Precedent shows courts are chary of awarding rights to
multiple claimants in a work, but they demonstrate underappreciated flexibility in which of those claimants is rewarded
with the copyright. And, the path to joint authorship, while difficult, is not insurmountable. While intent remains critical,
courts seem more generous in finding the requisite intent
where the claimed joint authors have made roughly equivalent
contributions to a work—or, at least, to its popular appeal. For
example, filmmaker Jonathan Morrill shot video of singer Billy
258. See Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1020.
259. See id. at 1016–17.
260. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186,
192–200 (2008) (discussing the history of authorship’s role in U.S. copyright
law); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 566–613 (2010) (describing historical trends in
authorship definition).
261. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 33, at 380–81, 445–46; Carroll, supra
note 72, at 804–10; Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1002–03, 1017–18.
262. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 314–20 (1991).
263. Carroll, supra note 72, at 810–25.
264. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 271–99
(2009).
265. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Author-Stories: Narrative’s Implications for
Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
16–22 (2001).
266. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1040.
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Corgan and his band (at the time), The Marked. Corgan took
a copy of the resulting film, “Video Marked,” and used 45 seconds of it in a video for his new (and much better known)
268
band, Smashing Pumpkins. Morrill’s suit for copyright infringement failed because the district court found that Corgan
269
was a joint author. Indeed, the genre of the work—a music
video—was critical to this finding: “music was therefore the
central component of the completed work . . . without the music
270
itself Video Marked would not exist.” The film’s audience ap271
peal resulted from both the videography and music. Corgan,
the subject, and Morrill, the videographer, were each instrumental to the original, creative expression in “Video Marked,”
272
and the court recognized both as authors. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that professional baseball players could negotiate, under the work for hire doctrine, for joint copyright own273
ership in telecasts of their games. And, the same court of
appeals lowered the threshold for joint authorship, deciding
that one need not contribute independently copyrightable ex274
pression to qualify. Courts still evince a strong preference for
unitary copyright, but are willing to consider a surprisingly
broad range of claimants for authorship.
Authorship should be understood as an entirely utilitarian
concept—one that is otherwise normatively empty. Copyright
posits a creative link between the author and the work’s creative expression, even if the Romantic notion of the lone artistic
275
genius was a trope at the time of its invention. Yet copyright
does not hesitate to invest rights in people or entities with only
267. Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1121 (C.D. Cal.
2001); see Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1023–24.
268. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. at 1122.
269. Id. at 1123–26.
270. Id. at 1124.
271. Id. at 1125.
272. Id. at 1123–26.
273. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d
663, 673 (7th Cir. 1986).
274. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Gaiman’s
contribution may not have been copyrightable by itself, but his contribution
had expressive content without which Cogliostro wouldn’t have been a character at all, but merely a drawing . . . Cogliostro was the joint work of Gaiman
and McFarlane—their contributions strike us as quite equal—and both are
entitled to ownership of the copyright.”).
275. See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY 48 (2009) (describing the “sadly heroic artist subsisting in a garret” as a “sustaining legend[]” of the publishing world in
the eighteenth century).
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an indirect link at best to creativity. For example, ownership of
foreign works restored to copyright subsists either in the author, or in the initial rightsholder as determined by the law of
276
the work’s source country. American law is happy to accede if
foreign countries confer copyright on non-authors. Or consider
277
a more familiar example: the work for hire doctrine. Under
its dictates, employees who create copyrightable works within
the scope of their employment have no copyright interest in
278
them. Rather, their employer owns the copyrights from the
279
moment of fixation. This is not a transfer—it is a reconceptu280
alization of authorhood. Similarly, for certain types of specially commissioned works, the person who produces it can agree
contractually to treat the party ordering the work as the au281
thor. Authorship becomes a matter of private convenience. In
both cases, the statute awards copyright to someone other than
the person generating the expressive work. It even flips the default: the employee, or commissioned party, must obtain a
282
signed agreement to claim copyright in the first instance.
This arrangement makes sense as a practical matter: the work
would not exist without the financial support of the employer or
patron, and vesting copyright with them avoids the risk of los283
ing the work to termination decades in the future.
But: this is a coldly instrumental approach to authorship,
divorced completely from considerations of whose master mind
produces the expressive content. Indeed, the copyright owner
may have no creative input whatsoever, yet still hold rights to
the work. For example, a New York City management company
retained three sculptors to produce lobby art for a building in
284
Queens. The company did not care what they produced, so
long as it fit inside the building; the sculptors retained “‘full au276. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b), (h)(6) (2012) (defining “restored work”); see Golan
v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877–78, 894 (2012) (upholding constitutionality of
§ 514 of Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which restored these works to copyright).
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”).
278. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737–38
(1989).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
280. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737.
281. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that “the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them” to so characterize the work).
282. Id. § 201(b).
283. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 737; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (providing
termination option for authors).
284. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995).
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285

thority in design, color and style.’” Several years later, the
building’s new owner sought to remove the resulting sculpture,
and the sculptors launched a lawsuit under VARA to block the
286
action. They lost, according to the Second Circuit, because the
sculptors were employees hired to produce art, and thus the
287
sculpture was a work for hire. The copyright owner supplied
money, space, and (at the sculptors’ direction) materials; the
288
artists supplied the creative work. And yet they were not authors. From an authorship perspective, the work for hire doctrine is easily justified on utilitarian grounds, but it requires
averting one’s gaze from the severed connection between the
copyrighted work and its creator.
Intimate media highlight, and can leverage, the conceptual
and doctrinal flexibility of authorship: these photos and videos
may support claims by a single author, by multiple authors, or
by no author. The subject of a photo may be its author, as
289
where the image is a self-shot. Both subject and photographer could be authors, where they deliberately collaborate and
290
each contributes copyrightable expression. Or, a photo might
be but a clinical representation of the person and setting,
where originality is so minimal as to preclude copyright protec291
tion altogether. The challenge for a singular approach to authorship is that photography and video have at least two significant channels for creative input: work in front of the camera
(lighting, posing, choice of venue, etc.) and work with the cam292
era (shutter speed, angle, flash, etc.).
Amateur, noncommercial intimate media are often created with limited tools:
285. Id. (quoting agreement between company and sculptors).
286. Id. at 81.
287. Id. at 85–88.
288. Id.
289. See generally Pamela Rutledge, #Selfies: Narcissism or SelfExploration?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday
.com/blog/positively-media/201304/selfies-narcissism-or-self-exploration.
290. Cf. Morrill v. Smashing Pumpkins, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1121–26
(holding that videographer was a joint author).
291. See Subotnik, supra note 132, at 1492–95.
292. See Farley, supra note 70, at 427–29, 434. See generally Christopher
Peterson, Gregory Crewdson’s $1 Million Photo Shoot, JPG MAG. (July 28,
2007), http://jpgmag.com/stories/1194 (describing one photographer’s extensive
creative input in photo shoot). There can also be post-capture editing and alteration, but these are likely rare with informal, amateur intimate media. See
generally Gregory Crewdson, Post-Production, APERTURE, http://www.aperture
.org/crewdson (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (describing post-capture process of
editing).
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smartphones, and simple digital cameras. These have comparatively few settings and adjustments—they are the sort of devices for which the term “point-and-shoot” was invented. Thus, the
creativity involved in working with the camera may also be limited; put another way, the contribution of the photographer or
videographer may be small, either due to technological constraints or simply minimal effort. Similarly, the contribution of
the subject can vary. A snapshot may involve little original expression, or the subject may select their costume (or lack of it),
pose, and so forth. Choices of venue and lighting may well be
joint decisions. It is difficult if not impossible to craft a clean
rule for the authorship of intimate media. Often, both the subject and the person holding the camera will have plausible
claims.
Joint authorship is no help. It requires shared intent—
intent to merge creative contributions, and intent to share authorship. The difficulty is that here, intent is a fiction: it is
most likely that the participants do not have any relevant intent. Private ordering through contract is another solution that
293
is plausible in theory but infeasible in practice. Here, too, authorship needs to be instrumental. It is capable of being flexible: in places, it adapts to solve difficulties created by each in294
dustry’s individual structure of production. Authorship is not
295
a holy icon—it is a chess piece.
Implementing this Article’s proposal will bolster output of
intimate media, but perhaps at the cost of fragmentation: others will advocate for special provisions to address their particular concerns, leading to an increasingly particularized and in293. See supra Part I.C.
294. Tushnet, supra note 28, at 1021 (“Authorship moves around as needed
to meet the needs of the industry.”).
295. In some cases, it may even be a ping pong ball. Sound recordings were
not listed among the works eligible for special treatment as a work for hire
under the second prong of the definition. See Mary LaFrance, Authorship and
Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002).
Then, in 1999, at the recording industry’s behest, a Senate staffer inserted a
provision into an unrelated satellite bill that added sound recordings. Id. Musicians erupted in protest. Id. at 375–76. A year later, Congress reversed the
change and swept the whole thing under the rug by statute. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012) (“Paragraph (2) [of work for hire definition] shall be interpreted as if
both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act
of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law
106–113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness
by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.”); LaFrance, supra, at 375–76.
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296

coherent copyright system. But copyright is nothing if not a
congeries of industry-specific tweaks. Copyrights in sound recordings do not include a right of public performance—except
297
via digital audio transmission.
Architectural works under
copyright have no protection against photographs or pictures
that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as
298
that building is publicly visible. The first sale doctrine lets
299
lawful purchasers rent movie DVDs, but not software DVDs.
A small cafe may show television programming on a set behind
the bar, but a giant restaurant in Times Square may not—
unless it complies with restrictions on the size and number of
300
televisions and speakers. Copyright is unprincipled: it is all
about special pleading. Distortion of an elegant copyright system is not a risk—because it is already distorted.
Special pleading can have value. There are pragmatic considerations for treating DVDs of motion pictures and software
code differently: the risk of widespread infringement is greater
301
with the latter than the former. The absence of a public performance right for sound recording copyrights originated in historical accident, but has come to make economic sense, as the
302
payola scandals demonstrate. The public performance right
exceptions for restaurants and bars were found to violate World
Trade Organization rules—yet America was content to pay a
303
small penalty each year to protect small businesses.
296. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO STATE L.J. 1361, 1388–1400
(2009) (setting out theoretical framework supporting uniform IP rights across
industries as default position); William Fisher III, The Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, HARVARD L. BULL. (2004), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/
bulletin/2004/summer/feature_2-1.php (discussing and analyzing how IP law
has varied by industry).
297. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012).
298. Id. § 120(a).
299. See id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
300. Id. § 110(5)(B)(ii).
301. John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15 n.45, 72 (2004).
302. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1908);
see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622–23 (2001). On payola, see Krystal
Conway, Comment, The Long Road to Desuetude for Payola Laws: Recognizing
the Inevitable Commodification of Tastemaking, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 343, 347–54 (2006).
303. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm; see also Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act,
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/
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Multiple authorship under the new 106B right may increase transaction costs by potentially requiring authorization
from more than one party, but copyright law is no stranger to
provisions that ineluctably increase transaction costs. The termination provisions by which an author can reclaim copyright,
free from prior licenses or assignments, require multiple nego304
tiations if one wishes to exploit a work for its entire term.
VARA mandates a separate contract for waiver of its moral
305
306
rights provisions. For U.S. works, a plaintiff alleging infringement must register her work with the Library of Con307
gress before bringing suit. She must be sure to register within three months of first publication if she wishes to recover
308
statutory damages from infringers.
All of these wellestablished copyright provisions increase transaction costs, but
that is not the measure of their worth. The key, as with the
new 106B right, is whether those costs are outweighed by their
309
benefits. For intimate media, the generative benefits of 106B
should eclipse its costs. If the concern is that this Article’s approach to authorship for intimate media will lead to a future
filled with industry-specific, atomized copyright law—that future is already here, and is not necessarily undesirable.
Copyright’s search for a single author often resembles Diogenes’s search of Athens for an honest man: fruitless and
310
faintly cynical. Enabling copyright law to recognize multiple
authors for intimate media improves the accuracy and
generativity of the doctrine.

dispute-settlement-proceedings/united-states-%E2%80%94-section-1105-us
-copyright-ac (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
304. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012) (enabling author to terminate transfer or
license during five-year period beginning thirty-five years from date of execution or publication); see Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 BTM (RBB),
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63858, at *4–13 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (discussing
need for music label to negotiate with each joint author who had transferred
copyright interest separately).
305. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012).
306. Id. § 101 (defining “United States work”).
307. Id. § 411(a).
308. Id. § 412(2).
309. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 359–61 (2008) (critiquing transaction
cost tradeoff for derivative works right); Landes & Posner, supra note 69, at
331–32 (discussing transaction costs of copyright law overall).
310. See Leon R. Kass, Looking for an Honest Man, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall
2009, at 160, 162.
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B. FIRST AMENDMENT
311

Copyright law both censors and promotes speech. This
brings the doctrine inevitably into conflict with the First
Amendment’s protection for free expression. Intimate media,
and this Article’s proposal for them, point up unresolved tensions in doctrinal and scholarly treatment of the copyright/First
Amendment intersection. Recent Supreme Court precedent is
highly permissive towards Congressional regulation of copyrightable works, engaging only in rational review unless the
statute touches upon the “traditional contours” of copyright
312
law. Scholars have responded with a mix of criticism towards
the Court’s approach and confidence that the First Amendment
still has a meaningful role in checking copyright. This subsection uses intimate media to explore the uncertain terrain of the
First Amendment and copyright’s “traditional contours.”
Copyright itself can be seen as a form of content-based restriction: it targets specified types of speech, and prohibits (via
313
314
injunctive relief, potentially harsh statutory damages, and
315
even criminal penalties, ) copying, distributing, adapting, or
316
publicly performing or displaying that speech. Read the Federalist Papers aloud on Boston Common and you are a patriot;
read Richard Brookhiser’s biography of James Madison aloud
317
in the same place and you are an infringer. And yet, so long
as Congress respects the (minimal) constitutional bounds on its
legislative powers under the IP Clause, judicial review of its
policies is extraordinarily deferential given the speech interests
311. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1393, 1398–99 (2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535,
538–45 (2004).
312. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating when “Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary”).
313. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
314. Id. § 504(c).
315. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
316. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“[S]ome restriction on expression is the
inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright . . . .”). There is a rich
scholarly literature on this topic. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the
First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright].
317. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON (2013).
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318

at stake. So long as Congress leaves the idea-expression di319
chotomy and fair use untouched, other statutory provisions
320
draw mere rational review. The courts defer to legislative
judgment as to what set of rights best encourages the creation
and dissemination of copyright-eligible information, even if the
statutory connection to incentives is quite attenuated. Thus,
Congress can lawfully keep copyrighted works from moving in321
to the public domain for an additional twenty years, and can
retract works from the public domain to place them under cop322
yright protection. The former might, the Court has held, en323
courage dissemination of existing works (for it could not en324
courage production of extant expression). The latter might,
via compliance with international obligations, improve protection of American works abroad, thereby augmenting incentives
325
to produce them. Similarly, Congress could strengthen the
distribution right for software and sound recordings beyond the
326
protections available for other works. When it thinks it necessary, Congress can even create new rights, such as VARA’s
327
moral rights, or the DMCA’s right of access for works safe328
guarded by technological protection measures. In short, Con318. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 185, 221 (2003); Netanel, First
Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1101; Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 316, at 3 (“[C]ourts have almost never imposed First
Amendment limitations on copyright.”).
319. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91.
320. Id. at 889 (holding challenged statute “falls comfortably within Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause” because “Congress rationally
could have concluded that adherence to Berne ‘promotes the diffusion of
knowledge’”).
321. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
322. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884–87.
323. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–07.
324. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
326. See supra note 193.
327. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012).
328. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A). While § 1201(c)(1) states that the DMCA does not
affect the scope of copyright entitlements or fair use, the circuit courts of appeal have split on whether a fair use defense is available against a
§ 1201(a)(1)(A) claim. See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928,
952 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress created a distinct anti-circumvention right under § 1201(a) without an infringement nexus requirement.”); Universal City
Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Chamberlain
Grp. v. Skylink Techs., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (requiring a nexus
between circumvention and infringement). Either fair use is a defense to circumvention, or the DMCA creates a new right under copyright. See Netanel,
First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1113–20. Neil Netanel ar-
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gressional power to shape copyright is nearly unchecked.
Should the legislature decide that intimate media require the
addition of the proposed 106B right, the courts are unlikely to
second-guess that judgment.
And yet, this Article’s proposal highlights tensions with the
First Amendment by pressing against the uncertain boundaries
330
of one of copyright’s “traditional contours”: fair use. Scholars
disagree strongly on how sufficient the traditional contours are
to accommodate First Amendment interests. Neil Netanel argues that they track Melville Nimmer’s influential “definitional
balancing” approach, under which courts weigh non-speech interests against speech burdens, and promulgate categories of
speech that are protected along with those that may be regu331
lated. For Netanel, the traditional contours create significant,
underappreciated limits on Congressional power to regulate
332
speech. In contrast, David Olson argues that the legislation
upheld in Golan is not only invalid under the First Amendment, since it fails to encourage the creation or dissemination
of new knowledge, but does not even satisfy the IP Clause’s internal requirement that legislation promote the progress of sci333
ence. Mark Bartholomew and John Tehranian contend that
the challenges of separating idea from expression make that
334
distinction an inadequate protection for free speech. And fair
use, they argue, has been applied to expand copyright, not to
335
constrain it.
And finally, for Jennifer Rothman, the First
Amendment has simply failed as a check on copyright law;
scholars and advocates should explore other limiting principles,
336
such as substantive due process and liberty interests.

gues that fair use must, on First Amendment grounds, operate as a defense.
Id.
329. Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1084–86.
330. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890–91.
331. Netanel, First Amendment Constraints, supra note 178, at 1084–87
(citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970)).
332. Id. at 1128.
333. David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 185, 194–98 (2011).
334. Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013).
335. Id.
336. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free
Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 493–503 (2010).
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This Article’s proposal tests these competing perspectives.
It explores whether the traditional contours—in particular, fair
use—are to be evaluated substantively or formalistically. The
337
new 106B right is not subject to fair use. However, it does
have a newsworthiness provision that provides robust free
speech protection, modeled on similar provisions in other IP
338
doctrines. Formalistically, then, 106B should face heightened
scrutiny since it transgresses the prohibition on removing fair
use protections. This Article argues, though, that the newsworthiness exception to the 106B rights should suffice substantively to accommodate First Amendment interests. If it does not,
then either formalism has overtaken free speech analysis in
copyright, or similar protections in other doctrines such as the
privacy torts and right of publicity are suspect as well.
While the newsworthiness defense is not co-extensive with
fair use, it is also not necessarily inferior to it. A parodic, nonconsensual use of a naked photograph of an identifiable person
would not be likely to be considered newsworthy, particularly
where there was no issue of public concern related to the pho339
340
to. Parody, by contrast, is a paradigmatic fair use. The unauthorized use of a photograph of two recognizable people in an
advertising campaign against same-sex marriage would likely
341
constitute copyright infringement, not fair use; however, the
advertiser would probably escape liability under newsworthi342
ness since the use would not count as commercial. The newsworthiness exception in 106B cannot be dismissed as an inadequate subset of fair use. Rather, it seeks to protect free
expression via a different mechanism.

337. See infra Appendix A.
338. See infra Appendix A.
339. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
340. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994);
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, 137 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
341. Cf. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 71–72 (2d Cir.
1997) (reversing the district court’s determination that a fair use defense was
warranted in a copyright suit involving use of an artistic poster on a television
set); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that no reasonable jury could find permissive fair use because the copied work included “the
essence of the photograph”).
342. See Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 22
(D.D.C. 2006) (finding no liability since, under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652C, there is no violation “when a person’s picture is used to illustrate a
noncommercial, newsworthy article” (quoting Martinez v. Democrat-Herald
Publ’g Co., 669 P.2d 818, 820 (Or. Ct. App. 1983))).
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Newsworthiness has been held adequate to the task of
safeguarding the First Amendment in other intellectual property doctrines, and in tort law. This suggests that, even under
heightened scrutiny, the new 106B right should survive substantive analysis. Consider the human cannonball. In Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court permitted a performer’s claim of infringement of his right of publicity when a local television station filmed his entire fifteensecond performance, during which he was shot out of a cannon
343
into a distant net. The station relied upon First Amendment
344
privilege to defeat Zacchini’s claim. Zacchini’s performance
was not fixed with his authorization (he expressly instructed
the television reporter not to record), and thus he could not as345
sert a federal copyright claim. While the Court repeatedly
346
drew analogies to copyright doctrine, it analyzed the scope of
the news reporting exception to Zacchini’s state law right of
347
publicity claim. The majority opinion recognized the need for
First Amendment accommodation via the exception, but none348
theless found that the broadcast exceeded it.
Doctrinally,
though, newsworthiness sufficed to protect free speech interests. The Court has ruled similarly in other IP contexts, such as
349
350
anti-sound recording piracy laws and trade secret laws.
343. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–66 (1977)
(5-4 decision). While the Supreme Court of Ohio treated Zacchini’s claim as
one sounding in tort, it explained that the core of the injury was to his “personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and
the exercise of his talents.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d
454, 459 (Ohio 1976), rev’d, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The right of publicity is thus
conceptually similar to intellectual property, and indeed Ohio’s statutory version of the right treats it as such. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2741.01–.99 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
344. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565.
345. Id. at 563–64; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (requiring copyrightable
subject matter to be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
346. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575–77.
347. Id. at 569 (“The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that
would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity.”).
348. Id. at 578–79.
349. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (5-4 decision). Appellate courts have upheld the federal anti-bootlegging statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2319A, which prohibits unauthorized recording of live musical performances,
without reaching First Amendment considerations. See, e.g., United States v.
Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding to the district court to
consider the First Amendment argument); United States v. Moghadam, 175
F.3d 1269, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the statute under the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause).
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There is analogous precedent on the topic of intimate media and newsworthiness. Nancy Benoit was a model and professional wrestler who was murdered by her husband, Chris
351
Benoit. Early in her career, Benoit had posed for nude photos,
352
which she believed had been destroyed at her request. They
were not. After her death, Hustler magazine published the photos, along with a minimal story about Benoit’s career and the
353
murder case. Her family sued based on infringement of Be354
noit’s right of publicity under Georgia law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that Georgia had adopted the newsworthiness excep355
tion to protect freedom of speech. The court analyzed the
interaction between the article (clearly newsworthy) and the
photographs (clearly not), to see if the aggregate merited pro356
tection. It did not—the court held that “the article was incidental to the photographs,” and hence could not immunize
357
them. Courts have similarly treated the newsworthiness exception as a sufficient First Amendment safeguard in other tort
contexts, such as with invasion of privacy via public disclosure
358
of private facts.
While 106B departs from copyright’s traditional contours
by omitting fair use as a defense, it ought to survive substantive First Amendment scrutiny. If it does not, copyright is left
with an uncomfortable dilemma: either the line of cases finding
newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalistically. In any event, review of 106B’s newsworthiness exception
is likely to elucidate the values and parameters at play when
350. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478–79 (1974).
351. See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009);
Philip Caulfield, Family of Nancy Benoit, Killed by Wrestler Husband Chris
Benoit, Battles Hustler in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/family-nancy-benoit-killed
-wrestler-husband-chris-benoit-battles-hustler-court-article-1.1012181.
352. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1204.
353. Id. at 1209–10.
354. Id. at 1204.
355. Id. at 1208.
356. Id. at 1209–10.
357. Id. at 1209. The court used the phrase “legitimate public concern,” id.
at 1208 (quoting Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal.
1998)), to distinguish newsworthy information from that which merely involved “morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.” Id.
at 1211 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. h (1977) (defining tort of unlawful publication of private facts)).
358. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975); Sipple v.
Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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courts assess the interplay between the First Amendment and
copyright.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
There are at least two alternatives to this Article’s IPbased approach to the issues surrounding intimate media, each
drawing upon a different doctrinal heritage. The first is criminal law; the second is privacy law. This Section briefly analyzes
each, and suggests reasons why this Article’s proposal is preferable.
A. CRIMINAL LAW
Some scholars would prefer to deploy federal criminal law
359
to deal with non-consensual distribution of intimate media.
For example, Mary Anne Franks, Danielle Citron, and Jacqueline Lipton look to federal cyberstalking, sexual harassment,
360
and hate crime legislation as models. Citron and Franks advocate new federal legislation that specifically criminalizes re361
venge porn. These scholars point to a number of benefits of
this approach. From a utilitarian perspective, criminal law
362
could achieve greater deterrence. The threat of prison will de363
ter the risk-averse and the judgment-proof. The state’s investigative powers dwarf those of a private litigant, making detec364
tion and enforcement more certain. The stigma that attaches
to criminal sanctions serves important expressive values about
how society views the conduct of those who distribute intimate
359. Section 230 preempts state criminal law, so a federal statute would be
needed. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), (e)(3) (2012). New Jersey’s statute is often cited
as a model for federal law. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(b)–(c) (2013); see, e.g.,
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20–22, 25–27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368946 (discussing New Jersey’s revenge
porn statute and proposing a federal criminal statute addressing the problem).
360. Citron, supra note 171, at 89–95; Franks, supra note 3, at 657–71;
Lipton, supra note 128, at 1118–22.
361. Citron & Franks, supra note 359 (manuscript at 25–27). The authors
also propose a model state statute to address the problem. Id.
362. See Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Law Response to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need-a-federal
-criminal-law-response-to-revenge-porn.html; Lipton, supra note 128, at 1117–
18.
363. Cf. Lipton, supra note 128, at 1117, 1131 (emphasizing the benefits of
criminal over civil law in this context).
364. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 598–
600 (2012).
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365

media without subjects’ permission. Finally, and most instrumentally, federal criminal law is exempt from Section 230’s
safe harbor, meaning that pressure can be brought to bear on
366
Internet intermediaries.
Federal criminal law may help, but there are reasons to be
skeptical, and in particular to prefer an IP-based approach.
First, deterrence may be greater under a system of private enforcement than public enforcement. While risk-neutral infringers would rationally calculate their expected penalties, in practice people tend to respond more to levels of enforcement (the
chance of being caught) rather than the level of sanctions or
367
expected penalty.
Enforcement levels—and hence deterrence—are likely to be greater under a private law regime than
368
a public law one.
Federal prosecutors face resource constraints—pressures from national security, narcotics, organized
crime, and white collar crime investigations are likely to
swamp efforts to prosecute revenge porn. Consider again enforcement of criminal statutes for intellectual property: despite
well-funded, motivated interest groups supporting more prosecutions, and despite passage of a statute with specific resources
devoted to IP enforcement, such cases are still unusual for a
369
U.S. ’Attorney’s docket. While private litigants face limits on
365. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594–601 (1996) (discussing the expressive role of criminal punishment).
366. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012).
367. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation:
How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 207–08 (2012)
(explaining the relationship between various insurance options and drivers’
choices); Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer
Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON.
863, 883–84 (2011) (proposing a relationship between traffic fines, safe driving, and automobile accidents); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock &
Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 661–64 (2006) (“Many studies find
very little or no deterrent effect at all from increasing the level of enforcement
or penalties.”).
368. Private enforcement is common, and successful, in other areas, such
as under the False Claims Act. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the
Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1244, 1244 (2012).
369. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 31. Congress passed the
PRO IP Act in 2008, Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256, 4256 (2008), when
the Department of Justice charged 259 defendants in 197 cases. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 157, at 31. Only once in the next four years (2010) did the
Department charge as many defendants (259, again), and never again did it

2014]

EXPOSED

2087

their financial resources and willingness to pursue litigation,
the availability of statutory damages under this Article’s proposal mitigates the former, and it is not clear why victims’ willingness to pursue relief would be less under a copyright system
than a criminal one.
Moreover, at present the limit on criminal efforts against
non-consensual distribution appears to be law enforcement interest rather than inadequate tools. Danielle Citron documents
extensively the resistance from police and prosecutors to tackle
infringement such as revenge porn, even when there are stat370
utes that clearly criminalize the conduct at issue. Norms predominate: prosecutors are, at present, generally unwilling to
371
pursue cases of non-consensual distribution. Indeed, the revenge porn prosecution of Holly Jacobs’s stalker has drawn
372
media attention precisely because it is so unusual. Enacting a
new statute will not shift prosecutorial behavior. And if an online civil rights effort changes how U.S. Attorneys approach
unauthorized distribution of intimate media, new laws may be
373
superfluous. It seems preferable to rely on distributed private
enforcement rather than scarce, and perhaps unwilling, federal
prosecutors.
The stigma of criminal sanctions has drawbacks as well as
benefits. A criminal statute would impose sanctions upon use
and distribution of truthful information. The courts have tradi374
tionally scrutinized such laws with particular care. And, the
bring as many cases. Id. As for results: in 2008, 242 defendants were sentenced. In the next four years, that number steadily fell (except for a one defendant increase from 2010 to 2011), reaching 202 defendants in 2012. Id.
These numbers comprise a small fraction of the Department’s caseload; in fiscal year 2012, the Department charged a total of 63,118 criminal cases against
85,621 defendants. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 6 (2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2012/12statrpt.pdf.
370. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 85–93) (on file with author).
371. See, e.g., Tracy Clark-Flory, Criminalizing “Revenge Porn,” SALON.COM (Apr. 6, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/07/criminal
izing_revenge_porn; Roy, supra note 23. See generally CITRON, supra note 370,
at 85 (“Prosecutors undercharge or, worse, refuse to charge perpetrators.”).
372. See Roy, supra note 23 (describing prosecution of Jacobs’s ex-boyfriend
as “the first time a victim has ever filed a criminal suit against her ex for distributing revenge porn”).
373. See CITRON, supra note 370 (manuscript at 85–93).
374. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (finding the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564,
575–85 (2002) (scrutinizing the Child Online Protection Act); Reno v. ACLU,

2088

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2025

trend runs towards increasing scrutiny—towards greater skep375
ticism about laws that ban information. Under Chief Justice
John Roberts, the Supreme Court has been especially rigorous
about evaluating laws that also made strong claims to tangible
harms, from bans on crush videos involving the torture of ani376
mals, to limits on violent video games due to negative effects
377
on minors, to tort liability for the deliberate infliction of emotional distress upon a deceased veteran’s family during his fu378
neral procession, and to limits on government funding based
on the need to reduce prostitution as a means of fighting the
379
spread of HIV/AIDS. Even revenge porn, despicable as it is,
does not fall within the few categories of unprotected expres380
sion that the government may regulate at will. Criminal law
prohibiting non-consensual distribution may not survive First
Amendment review. An IP-based regime is the safer, and likely
more effective, option.
Lastly, federal intellectual property law is also exempt
381
from the CDA 230 safe harbor; criminal law has no comparative advantage here. By contrast, state criminal law is pre382
empted by Section 230. California’s new revenge porn statute, for example, can create liability for people who initially
383
distribute intimate media, but it cannot affect intermediaries.
521 U.S. 844, 870–75 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act unconstitutionally vague). See generally Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) (“The Court has . . . expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.”);
Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1010–13 (2012) (discussing the Court’s treatment of statutes criminalizing speech).
375. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom–The Roberts Court, the
First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 409–10
(2013).
376. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010).
377. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
378. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
379. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2332 (2013).
380. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. But see Collins, supra note 375, at 416–37
(agreeing that the Roberts Court has tightened categories of unprotected
speech, but listing forty-three examples of types of speech that appear to be
unprotected).
381. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012).
382. Id. § 230(e)(3).
383. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (2014). The law is relatively weak even
for initial distributors. See Derek Bambauer, California’s New Revenge Porn
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Overall, while using federal criminal law to combat nonconsensual distribution of intimate media may be beneficial, it
is likely that this Article’s IP-based approach is even more so.
B. PRIVACY LAW
Privacy law dominates discussions around the production
and misuse of intimate media. Intuitively, privacy doctrine has
considerable appeal: there is something sordid and voyeuristic
about the unauthorized viewing of people captured in intimate,
vulnerable moments. However, privacy-based approaches share
common failings, one theoretical and two practical.
The theoretical failing of privacy law’s framework is that it
does not take seriously the benefits of intimate media. Privacy,
on this issue, is entirely about preventing harm to victims of
384
unauthorized sharing. That impulse is admirable, but it ignores another valuable consideration: structuring a legal regime to encourage the production and sharing of intimate media among consenting partners. The virtue of this Article’s
approach is that it addresses both: it creates a generative regime for intimate media, while reducing harm by punishing it
as copyright infringement. And, copyright law operates in practice like a privacy regime more often than either privacy or IP
385
scholars might like to admit. Howard Hughes bought the
386
copyright of a critical biography so that he might suppress it.
J.D. Salinger used copyright to quash quotations from his pa387
388
pers. Hulk Hogan sued to stifle his sex tape. In some contexts, copyright law can replace privacy law. It should do so

Bill: Helpful-ish, INFO/LAW (Oct. 2, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/info
law/2013/10/02/californias-new-revenge-porn-bill-helpful-ish.
384. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 93 (highlighting the problematic trend of
blaming victims of revenge porn privacy invasions); Kim, supra note 14, at
1006 (pointing to privacy law as a primary source of remedies for online harassment victims).
385. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Dangerous Meme That Won’t Go Away:
Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Content—Scott v.
WorldStarHipHop, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 14, 2012), http://
blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/05/the_meme_that_w.htm (arguing “we
need to vigilantly monitor the ecosystem for potential abuses” of copyright as a
privacy mechanism).
386. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir.
1966).
387. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1987).
388. Brown, supra note 235. Hogan relied on the right of privacy in asserting his claim. Id.
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here, since it addresses both the virtues and demerits of intimate media.
The first practical hurdle for privacy doctrine is the immunity conferred by Section 230 on intermediaries. While the
initial revelation of intimate media likely causes some harm,
the greater harm comes from the public availability and ongo389
ing sharing of these media. Privacy laws, with the important
390
exception of federal criminal ones, do not apply secondarily to
391
websites, search engines, or other intermediaries.
Privacy
scholars typically respond by seeking to circumvent Section 230
392
or by seeking to change it. Circumvention exists, but is rare.
While there are cases successfully bypassing immunity based
on privacy claims—typically, on the theory developed by the
Ninth Circuit that the website has contributed to the develop393
ment of the content —they are the exceptions that prove the
394
rule. Alteration or repeal of Section 230 is a hardy perennial
395
of privacy scholars and of state legislators. Thus far, efforts to
alter the 230 safe harbor have proved politically nonviable, and
if successful, would clearly come at some costs to intermediar-

389. As Mary Anne Franks writes, “the priority of most victims is to have
the material removed, not to recover damages.” Franks, supra note 362.
390. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012).
391. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) (finding privacy claims against search engines barred under Section 230); Gavra v. Google, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-06547-PSG, 2013 WL 3788241, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (“Congress gave [Google] a pass when it enacted
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.”); Goldman,
Unregulating, supra note 172, at 59–61 (explaining Section 230’s immunity for
websites that host user generated content such as Facebook).
392. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 13 (proposing an amendment to Section
230); Kim, supra note 14, at 997 (“[T]he immunity granted to them under section 230 . . . should not mean that Web site sponsors should be free from all
liability for harm arising from their businesses.”).
393. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521
F.3d 1157, 1165–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
394. See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828,
836 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (“The immunity afforded by the CDA is not absolute and
may be forfeited if the site owner invites the posting of illegal materials.”);
Gauck v. Karamian, 805 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 n.4 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (pointing
to the defendant’s invocation of Section 230’s immunity provision). See generally Ardia, supra note 24 (analyzing courts’ treatment of Section 230 since its
enactment).
395. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, State Attorneys General Want to Sue Innovators “For The Children!”, TECHDIRT (July 24, 2013 1:08 PM), http://www.tech
dirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130724/12345123927/state-attorneys
-general-want-to-sue-innovators-children.shtml (describing proposed legislation to eliminate Section 230’s protections for Internet intermediaries).
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396

ies and innovation. Section 230 is a barrier, but it is one
worth keeping.
The second practical failing is that, even if Section 230
were modified, privacy law may not be able to hold intermediaries liable for non-consensual distribution of intimate media
without running afoul of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment generally protects expression against government
efforts to ban redistribution of it, unless that expression falls
397
outside the category of “speech.” For example, a radio station
that broadcasts an illegally wiretapped conversation may not
be held liable, even though the person who initially taped the
content could be prosecuted, and even when the radio station
398
knew the taping was unlawful. A newspaper that publishes
the name of a minor who was raped cannot be subject to damages under a shield law forbidding publication of the identities
399
of victims of sexual offenses. A media outlet that identifies, in
contravention of the law, a minor charged with murder cannot
400
be prosecuted. The trend line is clear: those who disclose initially can be held liable, but intermediaries who republish cannot. This is a significant—if not insurmountable—hurdle for
privacy law to overcome.
While appealing at first blush, privacy law not only faces
doctrinal challenges to achieving its ends, but those ends are

396. See, e.g., Goldman, Unregulating, supra note 172 (arguing that any
new exceptions to Section 230 would undercut important benefits of the immunity); James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 48, 48–51 (2007), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/582
.pdf (critiquing proposals to make search engines more accountable for harmful web content); Lemley, supra note 172 (emphasizing the importance of safe
harbors for Internet intermediaries and advocating a more unified rule to ensure protection).
397. The categories of expression that are not speech, and hence are beyond any constitutional check save viewpoint discrimination, are clearly closed
at this point. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011)
(“[N]ew categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”). Revenge porn, or other nonconsensual intimate media, must therefore fit within
one of the existing categories (such as obscenity), or its regulation must survive scrutiny. See id. at 2733–41.
398. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–22, 534–35 (2001).
399. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989); see also Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471, 496–97 (1975) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth
Amendment will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.”).
400. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98, 105–06 (1979).
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insufficient: they fail to take account of the benefits of consensual sharing of intimate media.
CONCLUSION
Blame smartphones.
Whether Apple, Android, or Windows, smartphones today
share two key traits: they have cameras, and they are net401
worked. These characteristics explain the rise of amateurgenerated intimate media, and of its non-consensual distribution. The costs of production and distribution of this type of information—as with everything digital—have plummeted. Creating an explicit photo can be done easily, impulsively. And the
device that snaps the photo can share it as well. The cost of distributing analog photos was an effective barrier to most nonconsensual sharing; it was simply too much work. Even digital
cameras required a USB cable, a computer, and a separate Internet connection before media could be distributed via the Internet. But, as sexting proves, the smartphone has made intimate media ubiquitous.
Yet this Article comes to praise this change, not to bury it.
Intimate media generate significant, important benefits for
partners who use such images and video consensually. Recognizing that value is the key insight into why intellectual property law is best suited to tackle the challenges raised by nonconsensual distribution. Creating a right for identifiable subjects of intimate media to block unconsented sharing and display effectively curbs infringement, empowers people, creates
incentives for production, and avoids disturbing both the First
Amendment and settled Internet law. Ultimately, this Article’s
reform to copyright law enhances autonomy and generativity—
it enables us to meaningfully choose to whom we are exposed.

401. See generally Heather Kelly, How Much Better Can Smartphone Cameras Get?, CNN.COM (July 16, 2013, 1:53PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/
16/tech/gaming-gadgets/smartphone-cameras-future (summarizing qualities of
modern smartphones and emphasizing the importance of camera features).
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Appendix A
Proposed Text for Model Legislation
A Bill
To protect the consensual creation and sharing of intimate
media.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. Short Title; Definitions.
(a) This Act may be cited as the “Strengthening Healthy and
Responsible Exchange of Intimate Media Act,” or the
“SHARE IT Media Act.”
(b) Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by
inserting the following:
A ‘work of intimate media’ is either a photograph (as
defined herein under ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works’) or an audiovisual work that:
1) Contains an image that captures the body of one or
more living humans;
2) Captures intimate information; and
3) Enables one or more of the living humans captured
in it to be reasonably identified, such as by
capturing identifiable features or markings, by
accurately labeling the human or humans, or by
providing other identifying information in or
accompanying the work.
‘Intimate information’ is one or more of the following:
1) Sexually explicit conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2256(2)(B)(i) & (ii);
2) Depiction of a living human’s genitals or pubic area,
as defined by the term “graphic” in 18 U.S.C.
1466A(f)(3); or
3) The exposed nipple or areola of a living human female.
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Section 2. Rights in Intimate Media.
Title 17 of United States Code is amended by inserting after section 106A the following:
Section 106B. Rights in Intimate Media.
(a) A living human captured in a work of intimate
media, where that work includes intimate information pertaining to that person, shall have
the rights
1) To authorize the distribution of that work, or
of any copies of it, and
2) To authorize the display or performance of
that work, or of any copies of it.
(b) The rights in subsection (a) are independent of,
and in addition to, the rights conferred by Section 106.
(c) Section 109(c) of this title does not apply to the
rights in subsection (a) above.
(d) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not
be transferred. These rights may be waived if
the owner of the rights in subsection (a) expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument
signed by the owner. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work,
to which the waiver applies, and the waiver
shall apply only to the work and uses so identified.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a),
a person shall not be liable for infringement of
that provision for the display, distribution, or
performance of a work of intimate media if:
1) That person received the work, or a copy of
it, from a living human captured in the work
whose intimate information is captured in
the work, and
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2) Only that person views the performance or
display of the work, or a copy of it.
This subsection shall operate as an affirmative defensive to liability for infringement.
(f) Anyone who violates the rights in subsection (a)
is an infringer of the owner of the rights. For
purposes of Section 106B, a plaintiff must establish the following elements to establish liability
for infringement:
1) The work in suit is a work of intimate media;
2) The plaintiff was captured in that work;
3) That work contains intimate information
pertaining to the plaintiff;
4) A reasonable person could identify the plaintiff based on the work, and information accompanying it; and
5) The defendant displayed, distributed, or performed the work.
For purposes of this subsection, ‘distribution’ includes making the work, or a copy of it, available,
and does not require proof that anyone actually obtained access to that work, or a copy of it.
(g) For purposes of this subsection, an infringer who
is a service provider, as defined in 17 U.S.C.
512(k)(1)(B), infringes by distributing the work,
or a copy of it, by hosting it (as defined in 17
U.S.C. 512(c)), linking to it (as defined in 17
U.S.C. 512(d)), or caching it (as defined in 17
U.S.C. 512(b)), among other modes of distribution.
(h) This Section shall apply only to works of intimate media created on or after the effective date
of the legislation enacting the SHARE IT Media
Act.
(i) A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined
in subsection (f), shall be entitled to the reme-
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dies in Sections 502–505, except as otherwise
provided in this Section.
(j) A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined
in subsection (f), shall be entitled to recovery of
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as defined
in Section 505, unless the district court finds,
and supports with specific findings, that such an
award is not in the interests of justice.
(k) A plaintiff who proves infringement, as defined
in subsection (f), and who obtains an injunction
as provided in Section 502(a), shall be entitled to
removal and deletion of all digital copies of infringing works under the defendant’s control,
and to destruction of all physical copies of infringing works under the defendant’s control, as
provided in Section 503(a)(1), unless the district
court finds, and supports with specific findings,
that such relief is not in the interests of justice.
(l) The first clause of Section 411 is edited to read
as follows:
“Except for an action brought for violation of the
rights of the author under sections 106A(a) and
106B(a)”
(m) It is not an infringement of the rights in subsection (a) to perform, distribute, or display a work
of intimate media if
1) Such performance, distribution, or display is
newsworthy, or
2) The defendant has obtained express written
consent from the plaintiff to the performance, distribution, or display at issue.
A newsworthy performance, distribution, or display
must be one where the work of intimate media at issue is a matter of public concern. To evaluate
whether the work is a matter of public concern, a
district court may consider the Restatement (Se-
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cond) of Torts, section 652D (1977), and related
precedent.
(n) Section 107 is not a defense to infringement of
the rights in subsection (a). In a suit for infringement of the rights in subsection (a), a district court shall not consider Section 107.
(o) Safe harbor 1) A service provider, as defined in 17 U.S.C.
512(k)(1)(B), shall not be liable for monetary
relief, or, except as provided herein, for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of the rights in subsection (a) by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider, if the service provider
A. does not have actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material
on the system or network infringes the
rights in subsection (a), and
B. upon notification of claimed infringement
as described in paragraph (2) herein, removes or disables access to the material
that is claimed to be infringing within
five business days of receipt of the notification.
2) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement must be a
written communication provided to the designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially the following:
A. A statement that the complaining party
is a person captured in the allegedly infringing work of intimate media, or is authorized to act on behalf of such person;
B. The complaining party can reasonably be
identified based on the infringing work
or information accompanying it;
C. The work of intimate media contains intimate information pertaining to the
complaining party;
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D. The complaining party did not consent in
writing to the performance, distribution,
or display of the allegedly infringing
work of intimate media; or, the performance, distribution, or display at issue
exceeded the scope of the consent provided;
E. The complaining party’s name and contact information, including e-mail address; or, if proceeding pseudonymously
as provided in subsection (p), the complaining party’s unique identifier and
court information;
F. The uniform resource locators (URLs) or
locations under the service provider’s
control where the infringing media can
be located; and
G. A statement that the information in the
notification is accurate, under penalty of
perjury.
3) The limitations on liability established in
this subsection apply to a service provider
only if the service provider has designated
an agent to receive notifications of claimed
infringement described in paragraph (2), by
making available through its service, including on its website in a location accessible to
the public, and by providing to the Copyright
Office, substantially the following information:
A. The name, address, phone number, and
electronic mail address of the agent.
B. Other contact information which the
Register of Copyrights may deem appropriate.
The Register of Copyrights shall maintain a
current directory of agents available to the
public for inspection, including through the
Internet, and may require payment of a fee
by service providers to cover the costs of
maintaining the directory.
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4) A service provider receiving a notification of
claimed infringement under this subsection
must maintain the confidentiality of the notification, including by minimizing the number
of people who can obtain access to the notification, and by redacting identifying information before sharing it with anyone who is
not employed by the service provider or who
is not an attorney retained by the service
provider.
5) The following rule shall apply in the case of
any application for an injunction under section 502 against a service provider that is
not subject to monetary remedies under this
subsection. A court may grant injunctive relief with respect to a service provider only in
one or more of the following forms:
A. An order restraining the service provider
from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular
online site on the provider’s system or
network.
B. An order restraining the service provider
from providing access to a subscriber or
account holder of the service provider’s
system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in the
order, by terminating the accounts of the
subscriber or account holder that are
specified in the order.
C. Such other injunctive relief as the court
may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at
a particular online location, if such relief
is the least burdensome to the service
provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose.
6) Subject to paragraph (A), a service provider
shall not be liable to any person for any
claim based on the service provider’s good
faith disabling of access to, or removal of,
material or activity claimed to be infringing
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rights in subsection (a), or based on facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be
infringing.
A. The limitation on liability described
above in subsection (o)(6) shall not apply
with respect to material residing at the
direction of a subscriber of the service
provider on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider that is removed, or to which access is disabled by the service provider,
pursuant to a notice provided under subsection (o)(2), unless the service provider
I. takes reasonable steps promptly to
notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the material;
II. upon receipt of a counter notification
described in paragraph (B), promptly
provides the person who provided the
notification under subsection (o)(2)
with a copy of the counter notification, and informs that person that it
will replace the removed material or
cease disabling access to it in 5 business days; and
III. replaces the removed material and
ceases disabling access to it not less
than 5, nor more than 7, business
days following receipt of the counter
notice, unless its designated agent
first receives notice from the person
who submitted the notification under
subsection (o)(2) that such person has
filed an action seeking a court order
to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating
to the material on the service provider’s system or network.
B. To be effective under this subsection, a
counter notification must be a written
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communication provided to the service
provider’s designated agent that includes
substantially the following:
I. A physical or electronic signature of
the subscriber;
II. Identification of the material that has
been removed or to which access has
been disabled and the location at
which the material appeared before it
was removed or access to it was disabled;
III. The material that was removed or
disabled was newsworthy, as defined
in subsection (m)(1); or that the subscriber obtained express written consent to the performance, distribution,
or display of the work of intimate
media at issue, as defined in subsection (m)(2);
IV. The subscriber’s name, address, and
telephone number, and a statement
that the subscriber consents to the
jurisdiction of Federal District Court
for the judicial district in which the
address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the United
States, for any judicial district in
which the service provider may be
found, and that the subscriber will
accept service of process from the
person who provided notification under subsection (o)(2) or an agent of
such person; and
V. A statement that the information in
the notification is accurate, under
penalty of perjury.
7) Any person who knowingly misrepresents
material information in a notification of
claimed infringement, as defined in subsection (o)(2), or in a counter notification, as defined in subsection (o)(6)(B), shall be liable
as follows:
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A. To a service provider who received such a
notification of claimed infringement, or
counter notification, for the service provider’s actual damages, or for statutory
damages of $750 per allegedly infringing
work, at the service provider’s election;
and
B. To any person who uploaded, transmitted, or submitted the allegedly infringing
work at issue, in the case of knowing
misrepresentation of a notification of
claimed infringement; or, to any person
who submitted the relevant notification
of claimed infringement, in the case of
knowing misrepresentation of a counter
notification; for that person’s actual
damages.
A service provider who receives a notification
of claimed infringement or a counter notification containing material false information
shall not be liable for infringement based on
that notification or counter notification.

